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Abstract 
Choosing a mortgage is one of the most important financial decisions made by a 
household. Financial innovation has given rise to more complex mortgage products 
with back-loaded payments, known as ‘Alternative Mortgage Products’ (AMPs), or 
‘Interest-Only Mortgages’. Using a specially designed question module in a 
representative survey of UK mortgage holders, we investigate the effect of 
consumer financial sophistication on the decision to choose an AMP instead of a 
standard repayment mortgage. We show poor financial literacy and present bias 
raise the likelihood of choosing an AMP. Financially literate individuals are also 
more likely to choose an Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM), suggesting they avoid 
paying the term premium of a fixed rate mortgage.  
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1 Introduction 
 Since the onset of the financial crisis much controversy has surrounded innovations in 
the mortgage market. Mortgage provision is important for households – most households 
purchase a home during their lifetime and most purchases are funded by mortgage loans. For 
the typical household, a mortgage loan is the largest debt in the household’s portfolio and is 
secured against the household’s most valuable asset – the family home. The choice of type of 
mortgage used to finance a house purchase is a crucial decision for households, which has 
attracted much interest from policymakers. 
 The increase in mortgage lending during the 2000s was associated with the emergence of 
new types of mortgages, known as ‘Alternative Mortgage Products’ (AMPs). These 
innovative mortgage products offered new opportunities for households to purchase a home 
via a mortgage with much lower up-front costs. The key feature of an AMP is that payments 
cover only the interest due, or in some cases for an initial period, payments are less than the 
value of the interest due. Hence, the principal on the mortgage does not decline (it is ‘non-
amortizing’), or may actually initially increase.  
 While consumers may use an AMP to smooth non-housing consumption over time when 
faced with expected income growth, consumers lacking financial sophistication may choose 
an AMP by mistake or due to a bias towards higher initial consumption. It is widely accepted 
that mortgage market failure has played an important role in mortgage decisions in the sub-
prime mortgage market in the US (Mayer et al., 2009; Bernanke, 2010; Einav et al., 2012; 
Gerardi et al., 2013; Ghent, 2015). Cocco (2013) uses UK data to show many consumers use 
AMPs in a manner consistent with consumption smoothing. However, he also speculates that 
the greater complexity of AMPs together with poor consumer financial sophistication may 
lead some consumers to “fail to recognize that the lower initial mortgage payments imply 
larger future loan balances outstanding”, and that “the lower initial payments are particularly 
appealing to myopic borrowers who put relatively little weight of the future.” (p. 1667). 
 In this paper, we investigate the role of consumer financial sophistication in the choice 
between an AMP and a standard repayment mortgage (SMP), and also the choice between a 
fixed and an adjustable rate mortgage (FRM and ARM). We focus on two dimensions of 
consumer sophistication: understanding of the financial components of mortgage products 
(commonly referred to as ‘financial literacy’) and time preferences for consumption now or 
in the future, i.e. whether consumers have high discount rates or show a ‘present bias’ for 
consumption due to an underlying self-control problem. In the UK, the context of this study, 
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AMPs have been an important type of mortgage product since the early 1990s3. At the same 
time, default rates are substantially higher among households with AMPs, and a sizeable 
proportion of current AMP holders may not be able to repay their mortgage principal at 
maturity (Financial Conduct Authority, 2013). 
 The environment for our research is an extensive individual level consumer survey 
conducted in 2013 into which we incorporate a series of bespoke questions to measure 
financial literacy and present bias. We configure the financial literacy questions to focus on 
mortgage choices to provide an objective measure of respondents’ understanding of core 
concepts related to mortgage vehicles: the accrual of interest over time, simple interest 
calculations, interest compounding and the absence of principal repayments in an AMP. Our 
financial literacy questions do not require complex calculations, but do require a sound 
understanding of the core concepts embodied within each question, e.g. interest 
compounding. From these we discover that over two thirds of respondents understand that 
mortgages with longer maturities involve greater accrued interest and a similar proportion can 
make a simple interest calculation. But we also find that only half understand the concept of 
compound interest and fewer than 40% can correctly identify an AMP from a SMP. 
 We also insert a series of questions which have been developed in the recent applied 
behavioral economics literature to distinguish time preferences with respect to present bias 
and patience in survey settings. These traits may be important for understanding mortgage 
choices and are important controls in our econometric model. Both present-biased consumers 
as well as consumers with high discount rates may prefer AMPs because of the minimal up-
front costs. Individuals with high discount rates put little weight on the future; they find the 
lower initial payments of AMPs appealing as they allow higher present consumption. But in 
the case of present bias the preference for AMPs arises because of underlying self-control 
issues and a consequent overweighting of present consumption (Laibson, 1997)4. 
 We empirically model the relationship between financial literacy, behavioral 
characteristics and mortgage choices. Financial literacy may arise endogenously with 
                                                 
3 In our representative sample of UK mortgage holders, AMPs constitute around one quarter of UK mortgages 
and are held for the full value of the mortgage loan. 
4 In addition, a more impatient individual may be less willing to invest to the acquisition of financial literacy 
(Meier & Sprenger, 2013). They are also more likely to face binding liquidity constraints as they desire higher 
consumption early in life. As Cocco (2013) acknowledges, agency problems like those modelled in Inderst & 
Ottaviani (2012) may also play a role and AMPs may be sold predominantly to consumers with lower financial 
literacy or behavioral traits such as present bias. Hence, in this example, failing to control for time preference, 
the underlying determinant of both financial literacy and the choice of an AMP, will bias estimates of the rela-
tionship between financial literacy and mortgage choice. 
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mortgage choices if individuals learn from their mortgage market experience. We therefore 
adopt an instrumental variable model to control for this potential endogeneity. In our 
econometric model we instrument current financial literacy with early life mathematical 
ability, following Jappelli & Padula (2013). Mortgage choices may also arise due to 
affordability and credit constraints, which might correlate with financial literacy, hence we 
control for household income, income volatility and whether the household faces credit 
constraints. We also include a range of controls capturing mortgage characteristics as well as 
fixed effects for the year of mortgage origination. We further test the robustness of our results 
across samples of high and low income households, young and old households, and also to 
the sub-sample of households who recently made a mortgage refinancing decision. Choice of 
an AMP can also arise because households extrapolate past house price growth rates into the 
future; choice of an ARM may arise because the term premium is high. We test these 
conjectures in further robustness models. We also explore interaction effects between 
financial literacy and present bias. 
 Our results show that financial literacy and consumer behavioral traits are important 
determinants of mortgage choices. Poor financial literacy raises the likelihood of choosing an 
AMP. A decrease in financial literacy of one-point on our five-point scale raises the 
likelihood of an individual holding an AMP by around 53%. We show that this result does not 
arise due to reverse causality or simultaneity when using instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation. Our results also show that present bias is strongly related to AMP holding, even 
when controlling for patience. This suggests that the preference for an AMP due to present-
bias may arise because of an underlying self-control issue. This supports the contention of 
Cocco (2013) that myopic consumers are more likely to choose AMPs. 
 Our results also show that financial literacy increases the likelihood of choosing an 
adjustable rate mortgage compared to a fixed rate mortgage. A one-unit increase in literacy 
increases the likelihood of holding an ARM by around 22%. We find no relationship between 
present bias, patience and the choice between ARM and FRM. We show that the term 
premium is a significant predictor of choosing an ARM, supporting the results of Koijen et al. 
(2009)5. However, we also show that only financially literate consumers realize the added 
cost of paying the term premium of a fixed rate mortgage. 
                                                 
5 The authors provide evidence to show that long-term bond risk premia, i.e. the term premium, is an important 
predictor of ARM choice. When the term premium is high, ARMs are more attractive because FRM payments 
are higher. 
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 We know of no prior US or UK work on the interplay between financial literacy, present 
bias and choices over mortgage repayment type and interest rate type. For Dutch households, 
two recent studies have examined financial literacy and mortgage choices. In the Dutch 
context the characteristics of alternative mortgage products and mortgage holders are quite 
different to the US or UK setting (Cox et al., 2015; van Ooijen and van Rooij, 2016). The 
majority of ‘interest-only’ mortgages incorporate a linked investment account, which makes 
them very similar to a repayment mortgage in the sense that initial payments include a 
contribution to the pay down the principal. There are also tax advantages to using an AMP 
(with or without a linked investment product). As Cox et al. (2015) show, households holding 
AMPs are typically more likely to be educated, have higher average incomes and higher 
average wealth. Both studies find individuals with better financial literacy are more likely to 
choose an AMP. Using US data, other studies related to our work show individuals with poor 
understanding of portfolio risk are more likely to withdraw housing equity (Duca and Kumar, 
2014). Gerardi et al. (2013) find poor numerical ability in math tests predicts the likelihood of 
mortgage default.  
 Our findings contribute to the literature on the determinants of mortgage choices, in 
particular the choice between AMPs and SMPs (LaCour-Little and Yang, 2010; Piskorski and 
Tchistyi, 2010), but also the choice between ARMs and FRMs (Stanton and Wallace, 1999; 
Campbell and Cocco, 2003; Koijen et al., 2009). We also contribute to the literature on 
financial literacy by developing a new set of questions that measure literacy with respect to 
understanding central features of mortgage contracts. Our results are consistent with the 
broader financial literacy literature which shows the effects of poor financial literacy on a 
broad range of financial choices, including retirement savings, stock market participation and 
use of consumer credit (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a, 2007b, van 
Rooij et al., 2011a, 2011b; Disney and Gathergood, 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).  
 Our results are also important for the broader literature on present bias and self-control 
issues, which has shown that these are important factors for individual choice, both 
theoretically (Laibson, 1997) and empirically, for example for choices in retirement savings 
and in the labor market (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Ameriks et al., 2007; Busse et 
al., 2013). We also contribute to the expanding literature on investigating behavioral 
characteristics in representative surveys (Ameriks et al., 2007; Dohmen et al., 2010; Burks et 
al., 2012), as well as the potential interaction between time preferences and financial literacy 
(Meier and Sprenger, 2013). 
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the evolution 
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of AMPs in the UK mortgage market and in Section 3 the motivation behind our survey 
design, the survey instruments that we use plus initial results on characteristics of individuals 
by mortgage type. Section 4 describes our econometric modelling strategy. Following that, 
Section 5 presents econometric results from a variety of econometric models which reveal the 
impact of financial literacy and present bias on mortgage choice. We discuss our results and 
conclude in Section 6. 
2 The UK Mortgage Market 
 The UK mortgage market includes a significant share of AMP products with several 
characteristics that make it particularly interesting for the study of consumer mortgage 
choice. AMPs have been common in the UK since the early 1990s and were widely chosen 
by consumers (in our data 22% of mortgage holders have an AMP). There are three 
distinctive features of AMPs in the UK6. First, they are used to finance the entire mortgage 
balance over the full term of the mortgage. For example, in our data there are no instances of 
individuals holding both SMPs and AMPs, in contrast to the US market (Mayer et al., 2009). 
This implies that, compared to the US, in the UK market AMPs are typically held at higher 
loan-to-value (LTV) limits. Second, there are no conforming loan limits that dictate loan size, 
loan characteristics or the relationship between the two in the UK mortgage market. That 
means that AMPs are typically available under similar conditions as SMPs, e.g. with the same 
minimum deposits or leverage ratios. Third, unlike the Dutch market, most AMPs are sold 
without linked savings accounts7. A review of AMPs in the UK can be found in Cocco 
(2013), who examines the use of AMPs by individual mortgage holders in a sample of UK 
consumers beginning in 1993. For a recent review of international differences in mortgage 
markets see Badarinza et al. (2016). 
                                                 
6 Within the US, AMPs developed during the early 2000s as add-on products for conforming mortgages and 
incorporated limited or no amortization. In some cases, they incorporated negative amortization up to specific 
loan-to-value (LTV) limits, i.e. initial mortgage payments did not cover interest charges for some period. Some 
AMPs were coupled with a ‘teaser’ interest rate, implicitly assuming house price growth would exceed negative 
amortization ahead of the next mortgage refinancing point. The wide variety of AMP products offered in the US 
market is reviewed in Mayer et. al (2009). 
7 Historically, AMPs were commonly sold alongside stock-market linked investment vehicles designed to ac-
crue the principal payable at maturity. However, alleged mis-selling of endowment mortgages based on unreal-
istic returns resulted in the regulator demanding endowment mortgage providers to provide compensation to 
holders of endowment-linked mortgages in the early 2000s (see Severn, 2008 for a detailed review). The regula-
tor imposed compensation payments to make up for projected shortfalls in the value of accrued endowments. 
One impact of the mis-selling episode has been that mortgage providers no longer recommend endowment 
products and instead sell interest-only mortgages with no associated investment vehicles. In our dataset, two 
thirds of AMP holders report they have no linked investment product or other investment which they intend to 
use to repay the outstanding principal due at maturity. 
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 Previous studies have raised concerns about mortgage choices by UK consumers. The 
‘Miles Report’ (Miles, 2004) chronicles the innovation and features of the UK market, but 
also raises the issue of consumer misunderstanding of mortgage products. In particular, Miles 
(2004) argues that many consumers base their mortgage choice on initial payments only and 
not the longer-term horizon. The report also shows that consumers tend to focus on initial 
costs, but not on expectations of future interest movements, although it argues that forward-
looking consumers should factor in the likely future cost of different mortgage product types 
when making their borrowing decision.  
 FRMs in the UK mortgage market are notably different from those in the US in that the 
interest rate is fixed only temporarily, typically for a period between 2 and 5 years and only 
rarely longer than this. Therefore, borrowers taking on FRMs are exposed to much more 
interest rate risk compared with the US market where the rate is fixed for the full term of the 
mortgage. FRMs reset to a Standard Variable Rate (SVR) at the end of the fixed period, 
which is typically much higher than the fixed rate (for further institutional details on the 
functioning of FRM products in the UK see Miles, 2004, Section 2). 
3 Survey Data 
 To investigate the role of financial literacy and present bias in mortgage choice, we 
commissioned a special module in a survey of UK consumers. Our survey is the YouGov 
Debt Tracker, a cross-sectional survey of UK households, conducted quarterly by the market 
research company YouGov. We use the August 2013 wave which surveys a representative 
sample of 2,000 UK households drawn from YouGov’s panel of 350,000 households8.  
3.1 Survey Sample Characteristics 
 Summary statistics for the survey sample are presented in Table 1. Sample characteristics 
are very similar to those of larger official UK surveys9.  In total, there are 1,974 households 
                                                 
8 The survey is conducted via the internet and special provisions for non-internet users are made to achieve a 
representative sample (we later show that average levels of income, assets, debt and mortgage types in our data 
are very close to official data). The core Debt Tracker survey comprises approximately 80 questions that cover 
demographics, finances, labor market situation, education, financial product use and housing. The survey pro-
vides information on housing tenure and value plus details of the mortgages held. 
9 The summary characteristics of the sample shown in Table 1 closely align with those from the official ‘Wealth 
and Assets Survey’ (WAS; the largest UK survey of household finances interviews approximately 30,000 
households per annum, undertaken by the Office for National Statistics). In the 2012-2014 wave of WAS, the 
most recent available, 62% of main respondents report as employed with average household income of £33,500. 
Among mortgage holders, average household income is £46,400; self-reported property value £194,600 and 
outstanding mortgage debt £85,700; the average loan-to-income ratio is 2.18 and loan to value ratio is 0.51. 
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in our sample, of which 32% are mortgage holders, 32% are outright homeowners and 36% 
are renters. Mortgage holders are typically in midlife, better educated, more likely to be 
employed. Mortgage holders report, on average, the highest mean and median incomes of all 
subgroups. Renters are typically younger than mortgage holders and outright owners are 
typically older (79% of outright owners are aged over 55). Compared with whole sample 
characteristics, mortgage holders are more likely to be married (77% compared to 64% in the 
sample), have dependent children (36% compared to 20%) and to be in employment (85% 
compared to 59%)10. 
 We also construct a measure of whether the household is credit constrained, which may 
be an important variable in explaining mortgage choices. We identify credit constrained 
households with a set of survey questions from which we create a 1/0 dummy variable to 
denote credit constraints. This dummy is 1 if respondents answer ‘yes’ to at least one of four 
statements that describe whether they or their partner recently had a credit line withdrawn, a 
credit line reduced, have exceeded their credit line, or currently cannot get new credit. A 
household is also classified as credit constrained if respondents state that applications to 
unsecured credit products have been turned down recently.  
 In addition, we also construct a measure of income volatility in the sense of recent 
experienced income loss. We use four questions to create a create a dummy variable that is 1 
if the respondent states that they or their partner have experienced reductions in income 
arising from changes in labor or non-labor income or changes in employment status recently. 
 We focus on the 632 mortgage holders in the sample and divide this group by mortgage 
repayment type and interest rate type. Summary data by mortgage type are shown in Table 
211. In our sample 78% of mortgage holding households hold a SMP and 22% hold an AMP. 
53% hold an ARM and 47% hold a FRM. There are some demographic differences between 
holders of AMPs and SMPs. Compared with households who hold a SMP, holders of AMPs 
are typically less likely to have a household head in employment and have lower income 
(average income among AMP holders is approximately 10% lower than among SMP 
                                                                                                                                                        
These values are close to those in Tables 1 and 2, suggesting no large differences between our relatively small 
survey sample and the much larger WAS sample. 
10 These sample summary values closely match those of the ‘Understanding Society’ survey, from which equiv-
alent statistics are: to be married 65%; have dependent children 22%; be in employment 61%, average house-
hold income £33,200. 
11 Respondents are asked whether they hold a ‘repayment mortgage’ or an ‘interest only’ mortgage. If choosing 
interest only, they are then asked the type of interest only mortgage they hold (linked endowment, linked 
ISA/PEP, pension or no linked repayment vehicle). 
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holders). The differences in the average mortgage size of the two groups are small: AMP and 
SMP holders have similar average property values and outstanding mortgage amounts. The 
average loan-to-income ratio (LTI) among holders of AMPs is also similar compared to 
holders of SMPs (11% difference), consistent with the UK data sample used by Cocco 
(2013). By way of contrast there are no notable differences in characteristics between the 
FRM and ARM groups. 
3.2 Financial Literacy Questions 
  We first describe the design of our survey questions which measure financial literacy. 
We designed a specific set of questions relating to mortgage products. In our view, in the 
analysis of the relationship between financial literacy and financial choices, it is essential that 
the measure of financial literacy used by the researcher is relevant for the financial choices 
modelled12. For example, van Ooijen and van Rooij (2016) use Dutch data to show that 
mortgage choices are related to a measure of debt literacy based on understanding of 
mortgages, but unrelated to a generic financial literacy measure. It is also essential that the 
measure of financial literacy allows the researcher to judge better and worse levels of 
financial understanding in an objective way.  
 In designing these questions, we seek to achieve two objectives. First, to construct an 
objective measure of the extent to which an individual understands the key concepts in 
finance relevant for mortgage choice, and second, to do so in a design which is not 
mathematically complex and can be incorporated in a survey setting. The literature has 
documented that basic, or ‘core’, financial literacy varies in the population and that variation 
in correct responses to relatively simple questions about finance can explain significant 
heterogeneity in observed choices related to consumer credit and debt (Lusardi and Tufano, 
2015; Disney and Gathergood, 2013), retirement savings (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a, 
2007b; van Rooij et al., 2011a) and stock market participation (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005; van 
Rooij et al., 2011b). These studies typically use question-based instruments to measure 
individual understanding of, for example, compound interest or minimum payments on a 
credit product. Multiple-choice questions with relatively low mathematical requirements are 
                                                 
12 For example, financial literacy questions framed within the context of retirement saving decisions (for in-
stance focusing on the concepts of real vs nominal returns and annuity returns) are not appropriate for analyzing 
decisions relating to, for example, consumer credit and debt for which those concepts are not integral. Some 
concepts, such as interest compounding, are common to understanding of a wide variety of products, but should 
be incorporated into questions which focus on the particular domain of interest, in our case mortgage choice, to 
avoid framing bias. 
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used to avoid the financial literacy questions resembling a math test, or requiring infeasible 
calculations within the context of a consumer survey. 
 We adopt the same approach of question-based measures for the design of our financial 
literacy questions. We include four questions to the survey that aim to measure respondents’ 
ability to make informed decisions specifically with regards to mortgage choice, which we 
brand ‘mortgage financial literacy’. Each question was framed in the context of a particular 
dimension of typical mortgage contracts and constructed using a multiple-choice format. In 
the online survey, respondents could view answers to each question on screen with the option 
of choosing one. We also designed the implementation of the questions within the survey to 
avoid priming, anchoring and default effects13. 
 The four questions are (correct answers in italics): 
1. Suppose a 15-year mortgage and a 30-year mortgage have the same Annual 
Percentage Rate and the same amount borrowed. The total amount repaid will be: i) 
Higher for the 15-year mortgage; ii) Higher for the 30-year mortgage; iii) The total 
amount repaid on both mortgages will be the same; iv) Don’t know 
 
2. Suppose you owe £50,000 on a mortgage at an Annual Percentage Rate of 6%. If you 
didn’t make any payments on this mortgage how much would you owe in total after 
one year? i) Less than £50,000; ii) £50,000 - £54,999; iii) £55,000 - £59,999; iv) 
£60,000 - £64,999; v) More than £65,000; vi) Don’t know 
 
3. Suppose you owe £100,000 on a mortgage at an Annual Percentage Rate of 5%. If 
you didn’t make any payments on this mortgage how much would you owe in total 
after five years? i) Less than £120,000; ii) Between £120,000 and £125,000; iii) More 
than £125,000; iv) Don’t know 
 
4. Suppose you owe £200,000 on a mortgage with at an Annual Percentage Rate of 5%. 
If you made annual payments of £10,000 per year how long would it take to repay the 
whole mortgage? i) Less than 20 years; ii) Between 20 and 30 years; iii) Between 30 
                                                 
13 In particular, we adopted the following approach. First, the survey questions are designed to include a ‘don’t 
know’ answer in order to distinguish incorrect answers from self-aware consumers who recognize they do not 
know the answer, second the financial literacy questions are placed first, before the questions on behavioral 
characteristics, in order to avoid justification biases, third the question on the instrument (achievement in math 
education in school) is placed before the financial literacy questions in order to avoid priming effects arising 
from perceived performance on the questions, fourth the survey is administered online using a visual interface 
so as to reduce biases from ordering, finally respondents indicated their answers using radio buttons, with the 
buttons initially blank in order to avoid anchoring / default effects. 
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and 40 years; iv) The mortgage would never be repaid; vi) Don’t know 
 Performance of survey respondents on our questions confirms our prior that the 
questions are increasing in difficulty. Table 3 shows a breakdown of answers. The first two 
questions test very basic understanding of interest rates and how to make a simple interest 
calculation. In the whole sample 81% of respondents answer the first question correctly, this 
falls to 66% for the second. For the third question (interest compounding) and fourth question 
(amortization) these correct answer rates fall to 51% and 37%. 
 Columns 2 and 3 show unconditional comparisons of performance of subjects on these 
questions by their mortgage repayment type and interest rate type. The p-values from a test 
for the equivalence of means show that a lower proportion of AMP holders answers each of 
the questions correctly compared with SMP holders, with large differences on even the first 
question (28 percentage points). Overall, AMP holders answer on average approximately one 
and a half questions correctly, compared with two and a half for SMP holders. By contrast, 
the differences in correct answer rates across FRM and ARM holders is much narrower, with 
an overall difference of just 0.22 points on the five-point index, significant at the 5% level. 
 A detailed breakdown of individual characteristics by mortgage literacy score is 
provided in Table 4. The table shows that mortgage financial literacy strongly correlates with 
choice of repayment type. Among the 138 individuals with a score of 4 out of 4, only 12% 
hold an AMP compared with 67% among the 63 individuals with a score of 0 out of 4. The 
unconditioned correlation between mortgage literacy score and the likelihood of holding an 
AMP is -0.88. As might be expected, individuals with better mortgage literacy scores 
typically have a higher education leaving age, higher household income and higher property 
values. There is no clear relationship between mortgage financial literacy score and mortgage 
interest rate, LTI or LTV. 
 The literature recognizes that financial literacy arises endogenously with financial 
choices14. Financial literacy may be correlated with individual characteristics we do not 
observe directly (such as human capital) and other elements of an individuals’ financial 
situation (such as asset holding). Also, reverse causality may be at play whereby an 
individual’s mortgage choice affects their subsequent mortgage financial literacy through 
learning mechanisms. This may be relevant in our scenario: for example, the choice of taking 
                                                 
14 Christiansen et al. (2008), Lusardi & Mitchell (2007a, 2007b) and Behrman et al. (2012) show that models 
that do not control for correlated errors typically underestimate the effect of financial literacy on wealth accu-
mulation. 
12 
 
a SMP as opposed to an AMP may lead to consumers acquiring information on mortgage 
amortization through their mortgage statements, information which they would not receive 
had they taken an AMP, and so improve their performance on our financial literacy questions.  
 To address this, we also inserted into the survey design a question which allows us to 
develop an instrument for self-reported financial literacy. The candidate instrumental variable 
should be correlated with the instrumented variable (the financial literacy score), but be 
exogenous to mortgage choice and unrelated to the unobservable characteristics which may 
be related to mortgage choice. The instrument that we use has been suggested by Jappelli & 
Padula (2013), who demonstrate theoretically that pre-labor market entry financial literacy 
endowment is a valid instrument in estimations of financial literacy. Based on this, we 
include their suggested question in the survey: 
- When you were at primary school aged 10 how did you perform in maths compared 
to other children in your class? i) Much better than average; ii) Better than average; 
iii) About the same as average; iv) Worse than average; v) Much worse than average 
 In the UK education system, 10 is the age before high school entry and hence before 
students can self-select into subjects of interest e.g. economics and finance. From answers to 
this question we create a primary-school math level score ranging from one (‘much worse’) 
to five (‘much better’). We use this as our instrument in IV estimates. 
3.3 Measures of Behavioral Characteristics 
 In addition to the financial literacy questions, we include survey instruments to proxy a 
variety of behavioral characteristics. We focus on present bias and patience. Researchers 
seeking to measure behavioral characteristics typically use incentivized laboratory 
experiments involving choices for money. However, a laboratory setting necessarily limits the 
available subject pool. Consequently, recent research has seen the development of a series of 
survey instruments. These have been shown to correlate very closely with those obtained in 
laboratory studies (Vischer et al., 2013; Ameriks et al., 2007; Dohmen et al., 2010, 2011; 
Burks et al., 2012).  
 First, we elicit present bias using Likert scale responses by which respondents associate 
or disassociate themselves with a short statement describing ‘impulsive’ consumption 
behavior on a five-point scale from ‘agree strongly’ to ‘disagree strongly’. The statement is: 
- “I am impulsive and tend to buy things even when I can’t really afford them.” 
 This question proxies self-control issues in the sense of ‘present bias’, which we also use 
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in Gathergood (2012) and Gathergood & Weber (2014). Respondents are asked by how much 
they can see themselves preferring instantaneous gratification even when it is suboptimal, 
conceptually similar to the self-control measure developed by Ameriks et al. (2007). We 
create a binary variable that we label ‘Present biased’, taking the value of one if the 
respondent answers ‘tend to agree’ or ‘agree strongly’ and zero. We show below that our 
measure of present bias predicts credit card and other high cost debt holding as well as low 
holdings of liquid savings. The literature has shown that these financial behaviors are 
associated with present bias. 
 Second, we elicit patience. A measure of patience is particularly important for our 
analysis, because it allows us to distinguish self-control issues in the form of present bias 
from high discount rates (impatience)15, such as in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model of 
Laibson (1997). We do not assume that individuals in our data have preferences which are 
best represented by quasi-hyperbolic discounting, but show in our results these two distinct 
elements of time preferences are revealing in understanding choice behavior. Answers to the 
questions on patience and present bias are uncorrelated (the correlation coefficient between 
these two variables is -0.06), implying the two instruments capture distinctly different 
components of time preference. 
 We adopt a widely used short proxy for patience as described in Dohmen et al. (2010). 
The authors insert this measure of patience into the German Socio-Economic Panel to inves-
tigate the relation between risk aversion, patience and cognitive ability. The question is: 
- “How do you see yourself: are you generally an impatient person, or someone who 
always shows great patience? Answers are coded on an 11-point scale, with 0 refer-
ring to ‘very impatient’ and 10 to ‘very patient’.” 
 In a follow-up study the authors conduct incentivized time preference experiments on the 
survey subject pool and find that answers to the survey proxy provide very similar estimates 
as more complex elicitation procedures, such as multiple price lists (Vischer et al., 2013). 
They also show that answers to this survey question predict impatience even when control-
ling for impulsiveness.  
                                                 
15 The two concepts are theoretically distinct in β-δ models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to distinguish be-
tween linear (time-consistent) discounting (the δ part) and present bias (the β part), such as in Laibson (1997). 
This distinction may be important empirically: mortgage choices might be explained by high discount rates, 
implying that consumers make time consistent choices over time but simply prefer the higher current consump-
tion offered by an AMP. However, if mortgage choices are explained by impulsive behavior, there may be po-
tential for consumers to suffer regret over the choices they make and for these choices to be considered to be 
sub-optimal. 
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 Third, we measure risk attitude. Campbell & Cocco (2003) show that more risk averse 
households may prefer fixed rate mortgages. Individuals with greater risk aversion may also 
shy away from AMPs due to the underlying uncertainty of repaying the principal. 
Alternatively, risk averse households may exhibit a preference for AMPs if they are 
concerned with future income streams and the higher present repayments of SMPs. Our 
measure of risk attitude is again based on a question developed by Dohmen et al. (2010): 
- “How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take 
risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the 
value 0 means: ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 means: ‘fully prepared to 
take risk’.” 
 Summary data for behavioral characteristics of respondents are described in Table 5. The 
average numerical value for patience among all mortgage holders on the 0-10 scale is 5.56 
with a standard deviation of 2.55. The average level (and standard deviation) of patience is 
very similar across mortgage repayment type and interest rate type. AMP holders are on 
average slightly more patient than SMP holders and FRM holders are more patient than those 
with ARMs, but a t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that these values are equivalent. 
There is more notable variation across mortgage type groups in the degree of present bias. 
The table shows a breakdown of each answer to the present bias question by mortgage type 
and of our constructed dummy variable (‘Present biased’ = 1). In the sample of all mortgage 
holders, 13% of respondents are in the present biased category. A breakdown by repayment 
type shows that holders of AMPs are twice as likely to be present biased than SMP holders 
(19% compared with 11%), this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 Is there evidence to validate that responses to this question elicit present bias, or might it 
capture some other individual behavioral trait? The existing literature shows, both 
theoretically and empirically, that present bias induces higher levels of credit card debt and 
lower savings (Laibson et al., 2003; Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2010; 
Laibson, 1997). To explore this, we relate our measure of present bias to occurrences of high 
cost credit and savings. We estimate a series of regression models that relate our behavioral 
measures to the likelihood and levels of consumer debt and liquid savings.  
 In Columns 1 and 3 of Appendix Table A1 we estimate probit models where the 
dependent variables are indicator variables for whether the individual holds high cost credit 
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and savings, respectively16. Among those who hold a balance on at least one consumer credit 
product and have savings, respectively, we estimate the linear relationship between the log of 
the respective (non-zero) balances and our behavioral measures (Columns 2 and 4). The 
coefficient on the present biased dummy variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
all models except in Column 2 (the log of high cost credit), where the p-value is 0.016. 
Present bias raises the likelihood of holding high cost credit by 40% (average marginal effect 
of 0.188 divided by baseline probability 0.471) and decreases the likelihood of holding 
savings by 39% (0.198/0.506). We also include the patience variable in each model and find, 
in each case, the coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant at the 5% level or 
less. This evidence is in line with the prior literature and suggestive (without proving) that 
our survey measure captures present bias in individual time preferences.  
4 Econometric Models 
 Our main interest is in estimating the relationship between financial literacy, behavioral 
characteristics and mortgage choices. As we describe earlier, estimating the relationship be-
tween financial literacy and mortgage choices requires a strategy to account for the potential 
endogeneity of financial literacy to mortgage market experience. We adopt an Instrumental 
Variables (IV) strategy in which financial literacy is instrumented by our measure of early-
life math performance at school. 
 Specifically, we first take a fundamental model of the determinants of mortgage type, 
closely following Cocco (2013) in which mortgage choices are explained by a vector of co-
variates incorporating life-cycle characteristics: age, demographics (gender, marital and fami-
ly status, employment status, household income, income volatility) and also credit con-
straints. We then add our instrumented financial literacy index to this model. In subsequent 
specifications, we then test the sensitivity of our results to additional covariates which control 
for our measures of behavioral characteristics and features of the mortgage contract (level of 
debt, loan-to-value ratio, loan-to-income ratio and mortgage interest rate)17 as well as year or 
mortgage origination fixed effects. The survey data includes the year in which the household 
took out their current mortgage. Approximately 40% of all mortgages in our data originated 
                                                 
16 ‘High cost credit’ is defined as holding two credit/store cards or more, and/or holding a payday loan, pawn 
broker loan or home collected credit. ‘Savings’ are liquid savings in excess of £250. 
17 Following Cocco (2013) and Koijen et al. (2009), we control for LTV and LTI ratios. We also control for the 
level of mortgage debt as this might increase with financial literacy (as the consumer faces higher stakes) and 
also condition for the repayment type in the interest type regression, and vice versa. 
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in the last four years. It is important to control for characteristics of the mortgage as it could 
be the case that financial literacy is increasing in the level of debt, because the stakes in-
volved are higher, or that there could be cross-effects between the two mortgage types we 
consider in the analysis. With two dimensions of mortgage choice as our dependent variables, 
the models we estimate are: 
 
   Pr(Y = 1) = Φ(𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑏𝑏 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑚𝑚 + 𝐗𝐗′𝛽𝛽)   (Equation 1) 
  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ + 𝛼𝛼2𝑏𝑏 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑚𝑚 + 𝐗𝐗′𝛽𝛽 + 𝑢𝑢   (Equation 2) 
 
 Equations 1 and 2 are jointly estimated using maximum likelihood. 𝑌𝑌 represents a vector 
of mortgage type variables (dummy variables for AMP vs. SMP and ARM vs. SRM); 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 is the 
instrumented financial literacy score, instrumented in the first stage regression with the in-
strument 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ (the math performance at school index variable), 𝑏𝑏  is a vector of behavioral 
variables, m is a vector of mortgage contract variables, as described above and 𝐗𝐗′ is the vec-
tor of socio-economic and demographic controls, also as described above. In further analysis, 
we include the regional unemployment rate, the regional median 3-year growth rate of house 
prices and 5-year term premium, all at the year of origination.   We further test the robustness of our model estimates to a variety of alternative econo-
metric specifications. The choice of mortgage may be related to the affordability of the pay-
ment schedule (AMPs and ARMs have lower payments), which itself is determined by 
household income which correlates with financial literacy. Therefore, we test the robustness 
of our main results to sub-samples of high and low income households. Mortgage choice may 
be related to age, as older households may have more experiences that can affect their choic-
es. We therefore estimate our models split at the median age. For some households, which 
originated their current mortgage some time ago our measure of financial literacy may be 
outdated, so we also test the robustness of our results by restricting the sample to households 
who recently took out their mortgage. In addition to these we also estimate specifications in 
which we exclude individuals with endowment mortgages (with a stock market linked in-
vestment) and exclude those who state ‘don’t know’ to the financial literacy questions. Final-
ly, we test for the existence of interaction effects between financial literacy and present bias. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Econometric Results 
 Our main results from econometric models in which the dependent variable is mortgage 
repayment type are shown in Table 6 (full results with all covariates are shown in Table A9). 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the mortgage held is an 
AMP and 0 if it is an SMP.  Column 1 shows results from the parsimonious normative 
specification which only includes socio-economic control variables (including financial 
controls and credit constraints) and the instrumented financial literacy score. In the first-stage 
regression the single instrument, math level at a school, is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level (first-stage regression estimates and the non-instrumented probit results of the 
full model with all covariates are shown in Table A2). The F-statistics of the regression is 
13.7, above the ‘weak instrument’ test critical value of 10 suggested by Stock & Yogo (2005), 
though a Wald test of exogeneity fails to reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity (p = 
0.937). Results show the coefficient on the instrumented financial literacy score is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect of -0.107 implies a one-unit 
increase in the instrumented financial literacy score lowers the probability of the mortgagee 
holding an AMP by 11 percentage points, or a 30% decrease in the likelihood when evaluated 
against the baseline probability.  
 Model estimates in Column 2 show results from adding the behavioral characteristics 
variables to the Column 1 specification. The coefficient on the present biased indicator 
variable is statistically significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect of 0.131 implies a 
present biased consumer is 38% more likely to hold an AMP. The coefficient on risk attitude 
is significant at the 5% level and negative. This may appear counter-intuitive as AMPs can 
appear to be a riskier choice. However, individuals who are risk averse may see lower initial 
payments of an AMP which would reduce the exposure of the household to the negative 
effects of income risk. Column 3 further includes controls for characteristics of the mortgage 
loan (which may arise endogenously with the mortgage type). Among these the ARM dummy 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level and the amount of mortgage debt is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Column 4 presents the full model shown in Equations 
1 and 2. In this model the coefficient on the financial literacy score remains negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, the marginal effect implying a 1-unit increase in 
financial literacy lowers the likelihood of holding an AMP by 53%. We perform likelihood 
ratio tests to evaluate whether models with added covariates increase the explanatory power 
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relative to the baseline model in Column 1. These are significant at the 1% level in each case. 
Table A10 in the Appendix show results of the likelihood ratio tests comparing all model 
specification against each other. These results show that our additional covariates 
significantly increase explanatory power in all cases. 
 Results from models in which the dependent variable is interest rate type are shown in 
Table 7 (first-stage regression estimates are shown in Table A2, full second-stage results are 
shown in Table A10). The coefficient on the instrument is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The Wald test of exogeneity rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity at 
the 5% level in all specifications shown in Table 7. In Column 1 the coefficient on the 
instrumented financial literacy score is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The marginal effect from the coefficient of 0.115 implies a one-unit increase in financial 
literacy score raises the likelihood of the consumer holding an ARM by 23%.  
 Results in Columns 2-4 show that none of the coefficients on the behavioral 
characteristics variables are statistically significant, but that holding an ARM is related to 
mortgage characteristics. The likelihood of holding an ARM is increasing with holding an 
AMP and with the loan-to-value ratio and decreasing in the loan to income ratio and 
mortgage interest rate. When behavioral and housing-related covariates are included in the 
full specification in Column 4 the coefficient on the financial literacy score remains 
statistically significant at the 1% level, with the implied effect of a one-unit increase in the 
financial literacy score now raising the likelihood of holding an ARM by 22%, very similar in 
magnitude to the effect in Column 1. The likelihood ratio test statistics and p-values confirm 
that the addition of behavioral and housing variables increases the explanatory power of the 
models (see Table A11). 
5.2 Does ‘Extrapolation Bias’ Explain Mortgage Choices? 
 In the next tables, we explore whether other behavioral channels drive mortgage choices, 
and also explore their relationship with financial literacy. First, we investigate whether 
extrapolation bias over house price trends at the point of choosing affects mortgage choice. 
Extrapolation bias is the tendency to overweigh recent trends when making decisions about 
the future. This bias may be important for mortgage choices. In particular, mortgagees might 
extrapolate past house price growth into the future and on that basis choose an AMP, 
anticipating that a lower loan-to-value ratio will be achieved through house price growth 
instead of principal repayments. 
 Our survey data includes details of the time at which the individual chose their current 
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mortgage (in 2-3 year bands). The dataset also provides the four-digit postcode for the 
location of the survey respondent. There are 3,114 four-digit districts in the UK and we match 
house prices using official sales data18. We calculate the 3-year and 5-year growth rate of 
median house prices in the postcode district of the individual survey respondent in the period 
before the mortgage was taken out. We then include this as an additional covariate in our IV 
probit model. If the house price growth variable is positive and significant in the model for 
mortgage repayment type, this would suggest mortgagees extrapolated past growth in the 
decision to choose an AMP over a SMP. We also match in regional unemployment rates at the 
time of origination to control for local economic conditions.  
 Results are shown in Table 8. Column 1 reports estimates for the mortgage repayment 
type model. The coefficient on the 3-year growth of median house prices is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The marginal effect of 0.002 implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in the three-year median growth rate of median house prices 
(21%) increases holding an AMP by approximately 21%. We also replace the 3-year growth 
rate with the 5-year growth rate with similar results (results not shown). This result provides 
support for the extrapolation bias hypothesis. The regional rate of unemployment is not 
statistically significant.  
 In Column 2 we show estimates from the interest rate type model. The coefficient on the 
3-year growth rate is also statistically significant, but only at the 10% level with a small 
marginal effect. The coefficient on the regional unemployment variable is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, implying a one percentage point in the regional rate of 
unemployment lowers the likelihood of choosing an ARM by 6.9%. The marginal effect on 
the extrapolation bias coefficient implies a one standard deviation increase in the growth rate 
of median house prices (21%) raises the likelihood of holding an ARM by 8.3%. This implies 
individuals are more likely to choose to take a FRM when unemployment is higher, 
potentially reflecting the impact of uncertain macroeconomic decisions on the decision to 
take a lower risk (but higher interest rate) mortgage19. 
                                                 
18 In the UK, all prices for which houses and real estate are sold are recorded by the ‘Land Registry’. This data 
is currently not available for Scotland and Northern Ireland, we therefore estimate the model of extrapolation 
bias for English and Welsh households, only. 
19 We also estimate models with interaction terms between financial literacy and the 3-year median growth rate 
of house prices, and interaction terms between the present bias dummy variable and the 3-year median growth 
rate of house prices. We find no evidence for interaction effects in models in which repayment type is the de-
pendent variable. In models of interest rate type, we find a negative interaction between financial literacy and 
the growth rate of house prices, implying that more financially literate households are less likely to hold ARM 
mortgages when house price growth is stronger. One reason for this interaction may be that more financially 
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5.3 Term Premium and Interest Rate Type Choice 
 Another potential channel by which financial literacy affects mortgage choices is its 
effect on household responses to the term premium. Koijen et al. (2009) show that term 
premia are a significant predictor over holding ARMs: when the term premium is high, 
payments for FRMs are higher, making ARMs more attractive. We test this conjecture in 
Table 9 where we estimate the model for interest rate type including the term premium in the 
model (we exclude year of origination fixed effects which are collinear with the term 
premium variable in our data). We match in the five-year term premia calculated for the year 
of mortgage origination, as estimated by Malik & Meldrum (2016). The coefficient on the 
term premium is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying a 1% increase 
in the term premium raises the likelihood of choosing an ARM by 42%. Importantly, financial 
literacy remains positive and statistically significant. 
 Households may require financial literacy to recognize the time varying costs of the term 
premium, and in Column 3 we include an interaction term between the term premium and 
financial literacy. We find that the coefficient on the interaction is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, while the inclusion of the interaction leaves the main coefficient 
statistically not significant. Financial literacy remains positive and significant. These results 
indicate the term premium affects mortgage interest rate types only through the interaction 
with financial literacy – individuals with a zero-financial literacy score are no more likely to 
choose an ARM when the term premium is high, but individuals with higher financial literacy 
scores have an added likelihood of choosing an ARM when the term premium is high. 
5.4 Sensitivity and Robustness Tests  
5.4.1 High and Low Income Households 
 In this final section, we present results from additional models in which we test the sen-
sitivity and robustness of our main results. First, we show the results estimated on sub-
samples of high/low income households. Income may be a confounding factor in the relation-
ship between financial literacy and mortgage type if low income households, with lower av-
erage financial literacy, choose AMPs due to their lower initial repayments due to affordabil-
ity constraints. In our model in Equations 1 and 2 we include income as a control within the 
set of socio-economic covariates. To further examine the sensitivity of our results to house-
                                                                                                                                                        
literate households interpret strong asset price growth as an indication that monetary policy might tighten and 
are hence more likely to fix their mortgage interest rate. 
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hold income, in Table A3 we report estimates of Equations 1 and 2 estimated separately on 
sub-groups of households separated by high/low income split at the median. 
 Results for the models which explain AMP/SMP holding in Columns 1 and 2 show the 
coefficient on the instrumented financial literacy score is negative and statistically significant 
in both models at the 5% level. A Chow test for the equivalence of coefficients on the literacy 
score in the models in Column 1 and 2 cannot rejects the null of equivalence of coefficients 
(p = 0.516). The marginal effects on the estimated coefficients evaluated against the baseline 
predicted probabilities imply very similar effects across the models – a one-unit increase in 
financial literacy causing a 51% reduction in the likelihood of holding an AMP among low 
income households and a 45% reduction among high income households. This suggests that 
our results with regards to financial literacy are not biased by income effects. However, the 
results on the present bias show that the coefficient is only statistically significant for low 
income households, though a Chow test cannot reject the null of equivalence of coefficients 
(p = 0.137).  
 Results for the models which explain ARM/FRM holding in Column 3 and 4 show the 
coefficient on the instrumented financial literacy variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in Column 4 and positive in Column 3 but not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Again, a Chow test cannot reject the null of equivalence of 
coefficients in Columns 3 and 4 (p = 0.525). Again, these results indicate that the relationship 
between financial literacy and mortgage interest rate type is not driven by income effects. 
5.4.2 Younger versus Older Households 
 Additionally, we show estimates by sub-samples of younger (age 18-44) and older (age 
45 and above) households in Table A4. Results show that the relationship between financial 
literacy and holding an AMP is stronger among the young, though the coefficients on the fi-
nancial literacy variables in the regressions containing samples of older and younger re-
spondents are statistically significantly different from one another at only the 5% level (p = 
0.042). Results in Columns 3 and 4 show differences in the coefficient estimate which are 
statistically significantly different (p = 0.000), with the marginal effect from the positive co-
efficient on the financial literacy variable among the young sample regression implying a 
one-unit increase in financial literacy raises the likelihood of holding an ARM by 39%. These 
results show that financial literacy is more important for the choices of the young. One expla-
nation for this is that as households age and gain experience in mortgage decisions their fi-
nancial literacy is less important for their choices compared with the accrued effects of expe-
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rience and learning. 
5.4.3 Time Lag After Refinancing  
 The relationship between financial literacy and mortgage choices may also be sensitive 
to the length of time since mortgage refinancing. In Table A5 we show estimates by sub-
samples of recent refinancers (within the past 3 years) and earlier refinancers. Results show 
the relationship between financial literacy and the likelihood of holding an AMP is stronger 
and statistically more significant for the sub-sample of recent mortgage refinancers (Column 
1) compared with earlier refinancers (Column 2), with a Chow test confirming the 
coefficients in the two columns in the financial literacy index are statistically significantly 
different from one another (p = 0.000). Results for interest rate type indicator a slightly 
stronger relationship for households who refinanced recently, but the Chow test result cannot 
reject the null of equivalence (p = 0.758).  
 We also find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the credit constrained 
dummy variable for recently refinanced households, with the marginal effect implying that a 
household that is credit constrained is more than twice as likely to choose an AMP. This 
implies that credit constraints are important for the mortgage commitments taken on by 
households, with credit constrained households being less likely to choose SMPs with higher 
up-front payments. We further investigate interactions between financial literacy and credit 
constraints in Table A6. Here we find a positive coefficient on the interaction, implying that 
credit constraints raise the likelihood of holding an AMP among households with higher 
financial literacy. This indicates that, faced with credit constraints, more financially literate 
households may realize that to purchase a (large) home, they can only do so with an AMP 
with its lower initial payments. 
5.4.4 Sensitivity to Mortgage Classification  
 In addition to the above tests, we also examine the sensitivity of our IV probit results for 
mortgage repayment type to the definition of ‘AMP’ and the treatment of ‘don’t know’ 
answers. First, we consider the definition of an AMP classification. We re-estimate the IV 
probit model excluding individuals with endowment-linked AMPs20. This removes 36 
                                                 
20 As described in Section 2, some AMP mortgages were historically sold with linked equity investment vehi-
cles. Importantly, the endowment provider does not guarantee any shortfall in the value of these equity invest-
ments at the maturity of the mortgage, so an endowment-linked AMP does not guarantee principal repayment. 
However, an endowment-linked AMP could be considered to be a partial repayment mortgage. Therefore, to 
examine the robustness of our estimates to possible mis-classification of these mortgages. 
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observations from our estimation sample (24% of those previously defined as AMPs). Results 
are shown in Table A7 in Column 1. Our estimates are very similar to before. Financial 
literacy remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level and the marginal effect 
on the literacy score increases in absolute value a little. The implied effects of a one unit 
increase in literacy on the likelihood of holding an AMP is a 70% decrease. The dummy 
variable for present biased individuals is significant at the 1% level and the marginal effect is 
near identical. 
 Second, we consider treatment of ‘don’t know’ answers to our mortgage financial 
literacy questions21. In Column 2 we exclude individuals who might be of the latter type from 
the estimation sample. We remove observations with ‘don’t’ know’ responses to the first 
financial literacy question (which is the easiest question). We also remove observations with 
three or more ‘don’t know’ answers. This excludes 68 individuals from our sample. When we 
do so, model estimates are again very similar to before, with very similar coefficient and 
marginal effect magnitudes for financial literacy and behavioral characteristics. In Column 4 
we estimate the interest rate type model excluding ‘don’t know’ responses with the same 
criteria. Our results are nearly unchanged by the omission, and financial literacy remains 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 Third, in Column 3, we estimate a model which excludes individuals who are excluded 
by the sample selections in Columns 1 and 2 (102 observations). Again, the coefficient 
estimates and marginal effects are very similar. 
5.4.5 Financial Literacy and Time Preferences 
 Finally, we explore interaction effects between financial literacy and present bias. We 
first estimate models in which the financial literacy score is interacted with the present bias 
indicator variable. Theory suggests (see, for example, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) that 
individuals who are present biased yet sophisticated will prefer to commit to repayment. 
Results from models with interaction effects are presented in Table A8 and indicate no 
statistically significant interaction effect between these variables. Importantly, financial 
literacy remains positive and statistically significant. 
 In further results not shown we also estimate a series of models where we include 
                                                 
21 One potential problem with responses to our questions is that some individuals might answer ‘don’t know’ 
simply to avoid the (cognitive) effort involved in answering the questions. Hence ‘don’t’ know’ responses will 
comprise some genuine answers on the part of the respondents plus some answers stated simply to avoid exert-
ing effort in attempting an answer. 
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financial literacy, present bias and patience individually and in all combinations. We estimate 
these models as non-instrumented probit models, similar Columns 2 and 4 in Table A2, as IV 
and non-IV models are not directly comparable. When we do this, we find that the pattern of 
statistical significance, magnitude of coefficients and marginal effects are very close to those 
of our main results in Tables 6 and 7 (Columns 3 and 4). For the repayment type models, 
financial literacy remains highly significant and negative, present bias is positive and 
significant, and patience remains statistically not significant. For the interest type models, as 
before, only financial literacy is positive and significant. 
6 Conclusion 
 In this paper, we estimate the impact of financial literacy and behavioral traits on 
mortgage choices. We consider the choice between standard and alternative mortgage 
products and also the choice between adjustable and fixed rate mortgages. Our results are 
obtained using an instrumental variable (IV) strategy which addresses the potential 
endogeneity of financial literacy to mortgage market experience.  
 Our analysis highlights several key results: We show financial literacy is, on average, 
poor among those holding alternative mortgage products. Econometric results show that these 
differences in financial literacy among mortgagees give rise to large and statistically 
significant effects on the choice of AMP vs SMP in multivariate regression models. Results 
show a one-point increase in financial literacy lowers the likelihood of an individual holding 
an AMP by 53%. Our results are in contrast to studies using Dutch mortgage data, where 
alternative mortgages have different features, which find a positive relation between financial 
literacy and AMP holding (van Ooijen and van Rooij, 2016; Cox et al., 2015). However, van 
Ooijen and van Rooij (2016) find that among households who take out mortgages via 
mortgage brokers, those who are less financially literate choose riskier mortgages such as 
AMP mortgages (with a linked investment vehicle) or high loan-to-value ratio ARM 
mortgages. This is consistent with our findings. 
  We also show that financial literacy is related to the choice of the type of interest rate of 
a mortgage. Econometric estimates show that a unit increase in literacy increases the 
likelihood of holding an ARM by 22%. This suggests that consumers with higher financial 
literacy are more likely to appreciate the term premium cost of a fixed rate mortgage. Results 
also reveal that there is no evidence that present bias or patience are important for the interest 
rate type decision.  
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 Further results show that present bias is an important predictor for the choice of an AMP. 
Holders of AMPs are much more likely to be present biased (20% among AMP holders 
compared with 10% among SMP holders). Our econometric estimates show that this 
difference gives rise to large and statistically significant effects on the choice of AMP vs 
SMP, but not in the choice of ARM vs. FRM. Being present biased increases the likelihood of 
an individual holding an AMP by around 50%. At the same time, patience is not significantly 
related to the choice of holding an AMP. In contrast to these results, neither patience nor 
present bias are significantly related to the interest rate type choice of a mortgage.  
 We also find some heterogeneity in the relationship between financial literacy, present 
bias and mortgage choices across households by age and income. Financial literacy is more 
important for mortgage choices among younger households. Present bias is only relevant for 
low income households, though the effect is not statistically significantly different to that for 
high income households. 
 In additional analysis, we show further mechanisms at work in mortgage choices: 
mortgage repayment and interest rate types are sensitive to local house price dynamics and 
also responsive to the term premium. We show evidence that financially literate households 
respond in their mortgage interest rate type choices to the term premium, but those with poor 
financial literacy do not.  
 How should we interpret our results for the relationship between financial literacy, 
present bias and mortgage choice? We interpret this as evidence that behavioral 
characteristics are important for mortgage choices. For some consumers, the choice of an 
AMP may be the result of misunderstanding features of the mortgage product and our results 
are suggestive (without proving) that this is the case. They also suggest that myopic 
consumers who put little weight on the future are more prone to choosing an AMP. Although 
our data does not allow judgment whether a mortgage choice was ex-ante optimal for a 
household, results show AMP mortgages attract some customers who lack financial 
sophistication and may, as a result, make mistakes in their mortgage choices. 
  
26 
 
References 
Ameriks, J., Caplin, A., Leahy, J., and Tyler, T. (2007). Measuring Self-Control Problems. 
American Economic Review, 97(3), 966–972. 
Badarinza, C., Campbell, J., and Ramadorai, T. (2016). What Calls to ARMs? International 
Evidence on Interest Rates and the Choice of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages. Management 
Science, (forthcoming). 
Bernanke, B. (2010). Monetary policy and the housing bubble: Speech at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Economic Association. Speech from Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 499. 
Burks, S., Carpenter, J., Götte, L., and Rustichini, A. (2012). Which measures of time 
preference best predict outcomes: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84(1), 308–320. 
Busse, M.R., Knittel, C.R., and Zettelmeyer, F. (2013). Are Consumers Myopic? Evidence 
from New and Used Car Purchases. American Economic Review, 103(1), 220–256. 
Campbell, J.Y. and Cocco, J.F. (2003). Household Risk Management and Optimal Mortgage 
Choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1449–1494. 
Cocco, J.F. (2013). Evidence on the benefits of alternative mortgage products. Journal of 
Finance, 68(4), 1663–1690. 
Cox, R., Brounen, D., and Neuteboom, P. (2015). Financial Literacy, Risk Aversion and 
Choice of Mortgage Type by Households. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 50(1), 74–112. 
DellaVigna, S. and Malmendier, U. (2004). Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and 
Evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2), 353–402. 
Disney, R. and Gathergood, J. (2013). Financial literacy and consumer credit portfolios. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(7), 2246–2254. 
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., and Sunde, U. (2010). Are Risk Aversion and Impatience 
Related to Cognitive Ability? American Economic Review, 100(3), 1238–1260. 
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J., and Wagner, G.G. (2011). 
Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants, and Behavioral Consequences. 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(3), 522–550. 
27 
 
Duca, J. V. and Kumar, A. (2014). Financial literacy and mortgage equity withdrawals. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 80, 62–75. 
Einav, L., Jenkins, M., and Levin, J. (2012). Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets. 
Econometrica, 80(4), 1387–1432. 
Financial Conduct Authority. (2013). Dealing fairly with interest-only mortgage customers 
who risk being unable to repay their loan. FCA Guidance Reports, FG13/7. 
Gathergood, J. (2012). Self-control, financial literacy and consumer overindebtedness. 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(3), 590–602. 
Gathergood, J. and Weber, J. (2014). Self-Control, Financial Literacy & the Co-Holding 
Puzzle. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 107(Part B), 455–469. 
Gerardi, K., Goette, L., and Meier, S. (2013). Numerical ability predicts mortgage default. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
110(28), 11267–71. 
Ghent, A. (2015). Home Ownership, Household Leverage and Hyperbolic Discounting. Real 
Estate Economics, 43(3), 750–781. 
Guiso, L. and Jappelli, T. (2005). Awareness and Stock Market Participation. Review of 
Finance, 9(4), 537–567. 
Gul, F. and Pesendorfer, W. (2001). Temptation and Self-Control. Econometrica, 69(6), 
1403–1435. 
Heidhues, P. and Kőszegi, B. (2010). Exploiting Naïvete about Self-Control in the Credit 
Market. American Economic Review, 100(5), 2279–2303. 
Jappelli, T. and Padula, M. (2013). Investment in financial literacy and saving decisions. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 2779–2792. 
Koijen, R.S.J., Hemert, O. Van, and Nieuwerburgh, S. Van. (2009). Mortgage timing. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 93(2), 292–324. 
LaCour-Little, M. and Yang, J. (2010). Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later: Alternative Mortgage 
Products and the Mortgage Crisis. Real Estate Economics, 38(4), 687–732. 
Laibson, D. (1997). Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 112(2), 443–478. 
Laibson, D., Repetto, A., and Tobacman, J. (2003). A Debt Puzzle. In P. Aghion, R. Frydman, 
28 
 
J. Stiglitz, & M. Woodford (Eds.), Knowledge, Information, and Expectations in Modern 
Economics: In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps (pp. 228–266). Princeton: Pinceton 
University Press. 
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O.S. (2007a). Baby Boomer retirement security: The roles of 
planning, financial literacy, and housing wealth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(1), 
205–224. 
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O.S. (2007b). Financial Literacy and Retirement Preparedness: 
Evidence and Implications for Financial Education. Business Economics, 42(1), 35–44. 
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O.S. (2014). The Economic Importance of Financial Literacy: 
Theory and Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature, 52(1), 5–44. 
Lusardi, A. and Tufano, P. (2015). Debt literacy, financial experiences, and overindebtedness. 
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 14(4), 332–368. 
Malik, S. and Meldrum, A. (2016). Evaluating the robustness of UK term structure 
decompositions using linear regression methods. Journal of Banking and Finance, 67, 
85–102. 
Mayer, C., Pence, K., and Sherlund, S.M. (2009). The Rise in Mortgage Defaults. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 23(1), 27–50. 
Meier, S. and Sprenger, C. (2010). Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing. 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1), 193–210. 
Meier, S. and Sprenger, C.D. (2013). Discounting financial literacy: Time preferences and 
participation in financial education programs. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 95, 159–174. 
Miles, D. (2004). The UK Mortgage Market: Taking a Longer-Term View - Final Report and 
Recommendations. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
O’Donoghue, T. and Rabin, M. (1999). Doing It Now or Later. The American Economic 
Review, 89(1), 103–124. 
Piskorski, T. and Tchistyi, A. (2010). Optimal Mortgage Design. The Review of Financial 
Studies, 23(8), 3098–3140. 
Stanton, R. and Wallace, N. (1999). Anatomy of an ARM: The interest-rate risk of adjustable-
rate mortgages. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 19(1), 49–67. 
29 
 
Stock, J. and Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression. 
Identification and Inference for Econometric Models. 
Strotz, R.H. (1955). Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization. The Review 
of Economic Studies, 23(3), 165–180. 
Thaler, R.H. and Shefrin, H.M. (1981). An Economic Theory of Self-Control. Journal of 
Political Economy, 89(2), 392–406. 
van Ooijen, R. and van Rooij, M.C.J. (2016). Mortgage risks, debt literacy and financial 
advice. Journal of Banking & Finance, 72(449), 201–217. 
van Rooij, M., Lusardi, A., and Alessie, R.J.M. (2011a). Financial literacy and retirement 
planning in the Netherlands. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(4), 593–608. 
van Rooij, M., Lusardi, A., and Alessie, R.J.M. (2011b). Financial literacy and stock market 
participation. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2), 449–472. 
Vischer, T., Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Schupp, J., Sunde, U., and Wagner, G.G. 
(2013). Validating an ultra-short survey measure of patience. Economics Letters, 120(2), 
142–145. 
 
Table 1: Sample Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full
Sample
Mortgage
Holder
Outright
Homeowner Renter
Age
18–34 0.23 0.22 0.02 0.43
35–44 0.18 0.30 0.05 0.19
45–54 0.18 0.27 0.13 0.15
55+ 0.41 0.21 0.79 0.23
Demographics
Male (= 1) 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.46
Married/living as married (= 1) 0.64 0.77 0.78 0.40
Dependent children (= 1) 0.20 0.36 0.05 0.19
Education leaving age 18.44 18.95 17.74 18.63
Math level in school (1–5) 3.59 3.69 3.54 3.53
Employment
Employed (= 1) 0.59 0.85 0.31 0.60
Unemployed (= 1) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05
Retired/Student/Housewife/Disabled 0.39 0.14 0.69 0.35
Spouse employed (= 1) 0.37 0.62 0.26 0.24
Household Finances
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.16
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.12
Household income (£) 32900 43600 29400 26400
(28000) (39000) (24400) (23000)
Observations 1974 632 634 708
Note: Table shows summary statistics for all individuals in the survey (Column 1), plus for all individuals
divided into three mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups: those owning a home via a mortgage (Col-
umn 2), those who are outright home owners i.e. with no mortgage (Column 3), and those renting (Column
4). The variable ‘education leaving age’ is the age at which the individual finished full-time education. The
variable ‘math level in school’ is the individual’s self-reported mathematical ability at school on a scale
from 1 to 5. Mean values reported, medians in parentheses for financial variables.
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Table 2: Demographic and Housing Characteristics of Mortgage Holders
(1) (2) Repayment Type (3) Interest Rate Type
All Mortgage
Holders
Standard
Mortgage
(SMP)
Alternative
Mortgage
(AMP)
Fixed
Rate
(FRM)
Adjustable
Rate
(ARM)
Age
18–34 0.22 0.24 0.14 0.27 0.17
35–44 0.30 0.32 0.23 0.28 0.32
45–54 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.26
55+ 0.21 0.16 0.39 0.17 0.25
Demographics
Male (= 1) 0.53 0.54 0.46 0.48 0.57
Married/living as married (= 1) 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.80
Dependent children (= 1) 0.36 0.37 0.32 0.33 0.39
Education leaving age 18.95 19.15 18.23 19.19 18.74
Math level in school (1–5) 3.69 3.75 3.49 3.60 3.77
Employment
Employed (= 1) 0.85 0.89 0.73 0.88 0.83
Unemployed (= 1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Retired/Student/Housewife/Disabled 0.14 0.11 0.26 0.12 0.16
Spouse employed (= 1) 0.62 0.64 0.54 0.64 0.59
Household Finances
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.17
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06
Household income (£) 43600 44400 40700 44000 43200
(39000) (40000) (34000) (40000) (38000)
Housing
Property value (£) 204900 202600 212800 204100 205600
(170000) (165000) (177500) (172500) (165000)
Mortgage outstanding amount (£) 91700 91500 92500 95600 88300
(80000) (80000) (77900) (82000) (77000)
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.53 0.50 0.67 0.00 1.00
Mortgage interest rate 3.54 3.59 3.37 4.00 3.14
Loan-to-income ratio 2.41 2.35 2.61 2.48 2.34
Loan-to-value ratio 0.55 0.56 0.52 0.53 0.57
Term premium (in %) 0.46 0.47 0.41 0.60 0.33
Observations 632 492 140 294 338
Note: Column 1 shows summary statistics for the 632 mortgage holders in the sample. Column 2 divides the
sample by mortgage repayment type, Column 3 divides the sample by mortgage interest rate type. A ‘Standard
Mortgage’ (SMP) is a capital repayment mortgage in which mortgage payments include payment of the principal
which declines to zero over the term of the mortgage. An ‘Alternative Mortgage’ (AMP) is a mortgage in which
mortgage payments meet the interest on the principal. A ‘Fixed Rate Mortgage’ (FRM) is a mortgage in which
the nominal interest rate is fixed for some or all of the mortgage term. An ‘Adjustable Rate Mortgage’ (ARM) is
a mortgage for which the interest rate varies over the mortgage term, in the majority of cases the interest rate is
linked to the Bank of England repo rate.
Mean values reported, medians in parentheses for financial variables.
Table 3: Mortgage Financial Literacy Performance
(1) (2) Repayment Type (3) Interest Rate Type
All
Standard
Mortgage
(SMP)
Alternative
Mortgage
(AMP)
p-value
Fixed
Rate
(FRM)
Adjustable
Rate
(ARM)
p-value
1. Suppose a 15 year mortgage and a 30 year mortgage have the same Annual Percentage Rate and the same amount borrowed.
The total amount repaid will be:
Higher for the 15 year mortgage 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.000 0.07 0.04 0.091
Higher for the 30 year mortgage 0.81 0.87 0.59 0.000 0.78 0.83 0.077
The total amount repaid will be the same 0.08 0.05 0.18 0.000 0.08 0.07 0.720
Don’t know 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.004 0.08 0.06 0.343
2. Suppose you owe £50,000 on a mortgage at an Annual Percentage Rate of 6%. If you didn’t make any payments on this
mortgage how much would you owe in total after one year?
Less than £50,000 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.002 0.02 0.04 0.152
£50,000 – £54,999 0.66 0.72 0.44 0.000 0.64 0.67 0.349
£55,000 – £59,999 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.032 0.14 0.14 0.913
£60,000 – £64,999 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.007 0.03 0.02 0.430
More than £65,000 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.295 0.06 0.05 0.441
Don’t know 0.10 0.08 0.17 0.002 0.12 0.09 0.167
3. Suppose you owe £100,000 on a mortgage at an Annual Percentage Rate of 5%. If you didn’t make any payments on this
mortgage how much would you owe in total after five years?
Less than £120,000 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.359 0.13 0.16 0.338
Between £120,000 and £125,000 0.24 0.21 0.35 0.000 0.26 0.22 0.282
More than £125,000 0.51 0.58 0.28 0.000 0.49 0.53 0.284
Don’t know 0.10 0.07 0.20 0.000 0.12 0.09 0.167
4. Suppose you owe £200,000 on a mortgage with at an Annual Percentage Rate of 5%. If you made annual payments of
£10,000 per year how long would it take to repay the whole mortgage?
Less than 20 years 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.001 0.03 0.02 0.436
Between 20 and 30 years 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.731 0.29 0.30 0.800
Between 30 and 40 years 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.148 0.11 0.13 0.493
The mortgage would never be repaid 0.37 0.41 0.26 0.001 0.33 0.41 0.035
Don’t know 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.082 0.23 0.13 0.001
Literacy score (0–4) 2.35 2.57 1.56 0.000 2.23 2.45 0.030
Observations 632 492 140 632 294 338 632
Note: Table shows breakdown of answers to financial literacy questions. Column 1 shows statistics for all mortgage holders.
Columns 2 and 3 show statistics for mortgage holders by their mortgage repayment type and mortgage interest rate type. p-values
of t-tests are reported from comparing households by mortgage repayment type and interest rate type.
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Table 4: Characteristics of Mortgage Holders by Mortgage Literacy
0 1 2 3 4
Age
18–34 0.33 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.24
35–44 0.21 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.36
45–54 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.31 0.23
55+ 0.14 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.17
Demographics
Male (= 1) 0.27 0.48 0.48 0.58 0.67
Married/living as married (= 1) 0.78 0.73 0.72 0.77 0.83
Dependent children (= 1) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.42
Education leaving age 18.42 18.18 18.73 19.38 19.47
Math level in school (1–5) 2.92 3.37 3.68 3.93 3.99
Employment
Employed (= 1) 0.79 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.85
Unemployed (= 1) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Retired/Student/Housewife/Disabled 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.14
Spouse employed (= 1) 0.71 0.59 0.61 0.66 0.54
Household Finances
Household income (£) 37400 38400 41500 47600 47800
(33000) (35000) (36500) (45000) (40100)
Housing
Property value (£) 167800 188600 198900 214700 228800
(153000) (158400) (160000) (180000) (180000)
Mortgage outstanding amount (£) 82300 89900 91600 86900 103100
(75000) (74800) (81500) (80000) (97000)
Mortgage interest rate 3.60 3.95 3.38 3.37 3.63
Loan-to-income ratio 2.32 2.89 2.37 2.08 2.54
Loan-to-value ratio 0.55 0.58 0.53 0.46 0.66
Alternative mortgage product (AMP) 0.67 0.32 0.18 0.13 0.12
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.44 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.61
Term premium (in %) 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.43
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1) 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.12
Patience (0–10) 5.51 6.21 5.67 5.74 4.78
Risk attitude (0–10) 4.05 4.71 4.29 4.42 3.99
Observations 63 94 174 163 138
Note: Table shows summary statistics for mortgage holders by their financial literacy score (number
of financial literacy questions answered correctly). Mean values reported, medians in parentheses for
financial variables.
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Table 5: Behavioral Characteristics
(1) (2) Repayment Type (3) Interest Rate Type
All
Standard
Mortgage
(SMP)
Alternative
Mortgage
(AMP)
p-value
Fixed
Rate
(FRM)
Adjustable
Rate
(ARM)
p-value
Patience: “Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who always shows great patience?
Answers are coded on an 11-point scale, with ‘0’ referring to ‘very impatient’ and ‘10’ to ‘very patient’.”
Patience (0–10) 5.56 5.48 5.83 0.158 5.71 5.43 0.176
(6.00) (6.00) (6.00) (6.00) (5.00)
[2.55] [2.56] [2.52] [2.40] [2.67]
Present biased: “I am impulsive and tend to buy things even when I can’t really afford them.”
Agree strongly 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.005 0.01 0.03 0.087
Tend to agree 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.127 0.12 0.10 0.543
Neither agree nor disagree 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.975 0.18 0.22 0.159
Tend to disagree 0.32 0.33 0.27 0.180 0.36 0.28 0.032
Disagree strongly 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.520 0.32 0.35 0.491
Don’t know 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.548 0.01 0.02 0.678
Present biased (= 1)a 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.009 0.13 0.13 0.871
Risk attitude (self-assessed): “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you
try to avoid taking risks? Answers are coded on an 11-point scale, with 0 referring to ‘unwilling to take
risks’ and 10 ‘fully prepared to take risk’.”
Risk attitude (0–10) 4.30 4.39 3.99 0.054 4.51 4.11 0.019
(4.00) (4.00) (4.00) (4.50) (4.00)
[2.17] [2.18] [2.09] [2.06] [2.25]
Observations 632 492 140 632 294 338 632
a ‘Present biased’ = 1 if answer ‘agree strongly’ or ‘tend to agree’, and = 0 otherwise.
Note: Table shows breakdown of answers to behavioral characteristics questions. Column 1 shows statistics for all mortgage hold-
ers. Columns 2 and 3 show statistics for mortgage holders by their mortgage repayment type and mortgage interest rate type. Mean
values reported, medians in parentheses and standard deviations in square brackets. p-values of t-tests are reported from comparing
households by mortgage repayment type and interest rate type
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Table 6: Repayment Type Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
+ Behavioral
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
+ Housing
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
Complete
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Literacy score (0–4)  0.454***  0.107***  0.428***  0.098***  0.609***  0.128***  0.578***  0.120***
(0.156) (0.158) (0.158) (0.161)
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1) 0.570*** 0.131*** 0.491** 0.102**
(0.182) (0.193)
Patience (0–10) 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.027) (0.028)
Risk attitude (0–10)  0.079**  0.018**  0.069**  0.014**
(0.032) (0.034)
Housing
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.511*** 0.108*** 0.506*** 0.105***
(0.148) (0.151)
Mortgage debt (£10,000s) 0.043** 0.009** 0.044** 0.009**
(0.019) (0.019)
Loan-to-value ratio  0.167  0.035  0.170  0.035
(0.209) (0.210)
Loan-to-income ratio  0.017  0.004  0.021  0.004
(0.062) (0.063)
Mortgage interest rate  0.008  0.002  0.007  0.001
(0.023) (0.023)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 632 632 632 632
F-statistic of first stage 13.700 13.030 10.350 11.260
LR chi2 73.969 81.821 115.839 117.382
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.937 0.865 0.521 0.680
Baseline predicted probability 0.360 0.347 0.231 0.226
LR chi2 against baseline 26.566 54.554 78.124
Prob > chi2 against baseline 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Table shows IV probit model estimates and average marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sample includes all mortgage holders. ‘Financial literacy’ is instrumented with ‘math level at school’ which is a categorical variable taking a value
between 0 and 5, where 0 is lowest math level at school and 5 is highest. The first-stage regression and baseline probit model are shown in Table A2.
The baseline predicted probability is the average predicted likelihood from the model.
We show results of likelihood-ratio tests against the baseline specification (1) to evaluate the explanatory power of the other three models. Ta-
ble A11 shows likelihood ratio tests comparing all specifications against each other.
Further controls for age, (spouse) employment status, household income, education leaving age, gender, marital status and dependent children. Ta-
ble A9 shows the complete results of all variables.
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Table 7: Interest Rate Type Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
+ Behavioral
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
+ Housing
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
Complete
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Literacy score (0–4) 0.325*** 0.115*** 0.337*** 0.118*** 0.397*** 0.118*** 0.394*** 0.117***
(0.115) (0.111) (0.143) (0.138)
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1) 0.173 0.061 0.135 0.040
(0.157) (0.171)
Patience (0–10)  0.003  0.001  0.009  0.003
(0.021) (0.023)
Risk attitude (0–10)  0.036  0.013 0.003 0.001
(0.026) (0.029)
Housing
Alternative mortgage product (AMP) 0.826*** 0.246*** 0.811*** 0.241***
(0.191) (0.189)
Mortgage debt (£10,000s)  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.000
(0.016) (0.016)
Loan-to-value ratio 0.368** 0.110** 0.366** 0.109**
(0.173) (0.176)
Loan-to-income ratio  0.069  0.021  0.073  0.022
(0.044) (0.045)
Mortgage interest rate  0.075***  0.022***  0.076***  0.023***
(0.018) (0.018)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 632 632 632 632
F-statistic of first stage 13.700 13.030 13.010 12.610
LR chi2 58.790 65.293 176.141 175.862
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.022 0.012 0.060 0.050
Baseline predicted probability 0.508 0.507 0.530 0.530
LR chi2 against baseline 17.634 214.170 228.661
Prob > chi2 against baseline 0.007 0.000 0.000
Note: Table shows IV probit model estimates and average marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample
includes all mortgage holders. ‘Financial literacy’ is instrumented with ‘math level at school’ which is a categorical variable taking a value between 0
and 5, where 0 is lowest math level at school and 5 is highest. The first-stage regression and baseline probit model are shown in Table A2. The baseline
predicted probability is the average predicted likelihood from the model.
We show results of likelihood-ratio tests against the baseline specification (1) to evaluate the explanatory power of the other three models. Table A11
shows likelihood ratio tests comparing all specifications against each other.
Further controls for age, (spouse) employment status, household income, education leaving age, gender, marital status and dependent children. Ta-
ble A10 shows the complete results of all variables.
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Table 8: Extrapolation Bias
(1)
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
(2)
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Literacy score (0–4)  0.520***  0.110*** 0.561*** 0.174***
(0.172) (0.112)
Regional controls at time of origination
3-year growth of median house prices 0.009** 0.002** 0.007* 0.002*
(0.004) (0.004)
Regional rate of unemployment 0.002 0.001  0.112***  0.035***
(0.052) (0.042)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE No No
Observations 442 442
F-statistic of first stage 8.910 11.460
LR chi2 60.623 128.225
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.688 0.000
Baseline predicted probability 0.201 0.507
Note: Table shows IV probit model estimates for repayment type (Column 1) and interest rate
type (Column 2), with additional controls: i) the 3-year growth rate of median house prices in the
locality in the period before the current mortgage was taken out; ii) the rate of unemployment in
the locality in the year of origination. Origination year fixed effects are not included because of
collinearity.
Due to data restrictions, the estimated sample only includes English and Welsh households. Ad-
ditional control variables as in Table 6 and Table 7. ‘Literacy score’ is instrumented with ‘math
level in school’ in all specifications.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9: Interest type with Term Premium
Interest Type (ARM = 1)
(1) (2) (3)
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Literacy score (0–4) 0.440*** 0.145*** 0.468*** 0.147*** 0.778*** 0.237***
(0.119) (0.119) (0.184)
Term premium (in %) 0.698*** 0.219***  0.842  0.257
(0.127) (0.522)
Literacy score x Term premium 0.644*** 0.197***
(0.191)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE No No No
Observations 632 632 632
F-statistic of first stage 12.710 12.360 21.160
LR chi2 109.428 147.317 189.457
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.009 0.007 0.007
Baseline predicted probability 0.532 0.532 0.521
Note: Table shows IV probit model estimates and average marginal effects for the interest type models. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Specifications are identical to the full models in Table 6 and
Table 7, but includes the term premium at the year of mortgage origination and an interaction term with financial lit-
eracy. The interaction is instrumented with the interaction of the level of math and the term premium. Further notes
and controls as in Table 7.
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Table A1: Consumer Credit and Savings
High Cost Credit (HCC) Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Holds HCC log of HCC Holds Savings log of Savings
 / SE Margin  / SE  / SE Margin  / SE
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1) 0.505*** 0.187*** 1.456**  0.538***  0.198***  1.740***
(0.161) (0.663) (0.162) (0.566)
Patience (0–10) 0.032 0.012 0.091 0.035* 0.013* 0.037
(0.021) (0.097) (0.021) (0.088)
Risk attitude (0–10) 0.034 0.013  0.007  0.003  0.001  0.178*
(0.026) (0.111) (0.026) (0.106)
Household Finances
Household income < £15000  0.382*  0.142* 0.385  0.397*  0.146*  3.668***
(0.229) (0.990) (0.234) (0.772)
Household income £15,000–£30,000  0.125  0.046 0.065  0.097  0.036  1.226**
(0.149) (0.650) (0.148) (0.594)
Household income £45,000–£60,000 0.273* 0.101* 0.108 0.241 0.089 0.804
(0.151) (0.658) (0.150) (0.613)
Household income £60,000–£75,000 0.445** 0.165**  0.519 0.630*** 0.232*** 2.530***
(0.202) (0.840) (0.211) (0.754)
Household income > £75,000 0.419* 0.155*  1.718* 0.624*** 0.229*** 2.395**
(0.218) (0.874) (0.221) (0.976)
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.157 0.058  0.711  0.089  0.033  0.235
(0.154) (0.593) (0.157) (0.573)
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.426* 0.158* 3.268***  0.381*  0.140*  2.443***
(0.231) (0.980) (0.230) (0.740)
Age
18–34  0.549***  0.203***  0.892  0.198  0.073  0.037
(0.180) (0.841) (0.180) (0.757)
35–44  0.218  0.081  0.746  0.138  0.051 0.120
(0.177) (0.809) (0.177) (0.726)
45–54  0.206  0.076  1.207*  0.068  0.025 0.743
(0.166) (0.686) (0.167) (0.666)
Demographics
Male (= 1)  0.001  0.000  0.901* 0.166 0.061 0.750*
(0.111) (0.490) (0.111) (0.451)
Married/living as married (= 1)  0.729***  0.270*** 0.433  0.693***  0.255*** 0.175
(0.239) (1.157) (0.233) (1.082)
Dependent children (= 1) 0.113 0.042 0.875  0.091  0.033  0.402
(0.125) (0.575) (0.125) (0.515)
Employment
Employed (= 1)  0.290*  0.107* 1.070 0.078 0.029  0.924
(0.172) (0.703) (0.172) (0.705)
Unemployed (= 1)  0.169  0.063  1.303 0.091 0.034 1.369
(0.559) (1.105) (0.593) (1.919)
Observations 632 296 632 395
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.063 0.130 0.072 0.169
LR chi2 / F 55.093 3.177 63.399 5.921
Prob > chi2 /F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Baseline predicted probability 0.472 2.818 0.504 4.673
Note: Columns 1 and 3 show probit estimates and average marginal effects on whether respondents hold high cost credit and sav-
ings, respectively. Columns 2 and 4 show results of OLSmodels with robust standard errors on the balances of high cost credit and
savings, respectively, conditional on holding those balances. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ‘High cost credit’ is defined as
holding two credit/store cards or more or holding a payday loan, pawn broker loan or home collected credit. ‘Savings’ are liquid
savings in excess of £250. Additional controls for spouse employment status. Omitted reference group for age is 55+; for income
£30,000–£45,000; for employment Retired/Student/Housewife/Disabled.
Table A2: First-stage and non-instrumented Probit Models
Repayment Type Interest Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Stage
Regression
Probit
(AMP = 1)
First Stage
Regression
Probit
(ARM = 1)
 / SE  / SE Margin  / SE  / SE Margin
Instrument
Math level in school (1–5) 0.437*** 0.386***
(0.050) (0.047)
Financial Literacy
Literacy score (0–4)  0.515***  0.107*** 0.117** 0.036**
(0.061) (0.052)
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1)  0.208 0.509*** 0.106***  0.068 0.120 0.037
(0.138) (0.188) (0.131) (0.175)
Patience (0–10)  0.043** 0.006 0.001  0.036**  0.019  0.006
(0.019) (0.028) (0.018) (0.023)
Risk attitude (0–10)  0.038*  0.068**  0.014**  0.049**  0.008  0.002
(0.023) (0.034) (0.022) (0.029)
Housing
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.020 0.501*** 0.104***
(0.102) (0.151)
Alternative mortgage product (AMP)  0.929*** 0.548*** 0.168***
(0.111) (0.157)
Mortgage debt (£10,000s)  0.005 0.045** 0.009** 0.004 0.002 0.001
(0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016)
Loan-to-value ratio  0.248*  0.151  0.031  0.236* 0.320* 0.098*
(0.133) (0.206) (0.125) (0.182)
Loan-to-income ratio 0.047  0.026  0.005 0.037  0.069  0.021
(0.037) (0.063) (0.035) (0.047)
Mortgage interest rate  0.002  0.007  0.002  0.005  0.083***  0.025***
(0.014) (0.023) (0.013) (0.018)
Household Finances
Recent income loss (= 1)  0.286**  0.145  0.030  0.285** 0.307* 0.094*
(0.136) (0.188) (0.128) (0.172)
Credit constrained (= 1)  0.020 0.483* 0.101* 0.073  0.031  0.009
(0.197) (0.269) (0.186) (0.243)
Age
18–34  0.110  0.877***  0.183***  0.274* 0.102 0.031
(0.172) (0.255) (0.164) (0.216)
35–44 0.144  0.690***  0.144***  0.011 0.178 0.054
(0.158) (0.229) (0.150) (0.196)
45–54 0.003  0.485**  0.101**  0.113  0.037  0.011
(0.147) (0.207) (0.139) (0.180)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 632 632 632 632
LR F/chi2 11.260 194.072 12.610 188.152
Prob > F/chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Baseline predicted probability 2.347 0.220 2.347 0.534
Note: Table shows first-stage regression results and the results of the non-instrumented probit models (where financial liter-
acy is not instrumented) of the complete models of Table 6 (Columns 1 and 2) and Table 7 (Columns 3 and 4).
Omitted reference group for age is 55+. Further controls for (spouse) employment status, household income, education leav-
ing age, gender, marital status and dependent children.
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Table A3: Mortgage choice – Sample Split at Median Income
Repayment Type (AMP = 1) Interest Type (ARM = 1)
(1) Low income (2) High income (3) Low income (4) High income
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Literacy score (0–4)  0.473**  0.108**  0.478**  0.091** 0.322 0.089 0.432*** 0.130***
(0.243) (0.211) (0.222) (0.157)
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1) 0.684*** 0.157*** 0.086 0.016 0.134 0.037 0.196 0.059
(0.245) (0.316) (0.239) (0.257)
Patience (0–10)  0.032  0.007 0.052 0.010 0.020 0.006  0.025  0.008
(0.037) (0.048) (0.033) (0.035)
Risk attitude (0–10)  0.053  0.012  0.119**  0.022**  0.009  0.002 0.020 0.006
(0.050) (0.054) (0.046) (0.042)
Housing
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.611*** 0.140*** 0.414* 0.078*
(0.193) (0.223)
Alternative mortgage product (AMP) 0.763*** 0.210*** 0.758*** 0.228***
(0.278) (0.243)
Mortgage debt (£10,000s) 0.090** 0.021** 0.054 0.010  0.075**  0.021** 0.048 0.014
(0.042) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Loan-to-value ratio  1.333***  0.306*** 0.485 0.092 0.757*** 0.209*** 0.359 0.108
(0.478) (0.442) (0.293) (0.288)
Loan-to-income ratio  0.004  0.001  0.183  0.035 0.001 0.000  0.256  0.077
(0.072) (0.189) (0.057) (0.178)
Mortgage interest rate 0.013 0.003  0.019  0.004  0.099***  0.027***  0.071**  0.021**
(0.029) (0.043) (0.026) (0.031)
Household Finances
Recent income loss (= 1)  0.200  0.046  0.302  0.057 0.528** 0.146** 0.287 0.086
(0.247) (0.372) (0.230) (0.270)
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.514 0.118 0.115 0.022 0.015 0.004 0.133 0.040
(0.358) (0.445) (0.373) (0.345)
Age
18–34  0.939***  0.215***  1.521***  0.288*** 0.464 0.128  0.142  0.043
(0.357) (0.400) (0.325) (0.304)
35–44  0.685**  0.157**  1.199***  0.227*** 0.253 0.070 0.030 0.009
(0.320) (0.333) (0.283) (0.273)
45–54  0.565**  0.129**  1.049***  0.199*** 0.005 0.001  0.003  0.001
(0.283) (0.322) (0.265) (0.261)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 318 314 318 314
F-statistic of first stage 8.670 8.710 11.020 10.370
LR chi2 52.463 56.222 94.068 90.204
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.951 0.839 0.259 0.036
Baseline predicted probability 0.212 0.203 0.525 0.433
Note: Table shows IV probit model estimates and average marginal effects for the repayment-type models and interest-type models. The sample is
split at the median income. Households at the median are included in the low-income group. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in
parentheses. Further notes apply as in Table 6 and Table 7.
Omitted reference group for age is 55+. Further controls for (spouse) employment status, household income, education leaving age, gender, marital
status and dependent children.
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Table A4: Mortgage choice – Sample Split by Age Groups
Repayment Type (AMP = 1) Interest Type (ARM = 1)
(1) Age 18–44 (2) Age 45+ (3) Age 18–44 (4) Age 45+
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Literacy score (0–4)  0.960***  0.142***  0.398*  0.090 0.834*** 0.209***  0.009  0.003
(0.183) (0.242) (0.099) (0.230)
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1) 0.980*** 0.145*** 0.180 0.044  0.048  0.012 0.433 0.138
(0.349) (0.289) (0.218) (0.284)
Patience (0–10)  0.038  0.006 0.013 0.003  0.018  0.005 0.034 0.011
(0.046) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033)
Risk attitude (0–10) 0.017 0.002  0.071  0.018 0.029 0.007  0.036  0.011
(0.055) (0.045) (0.039) (0.042)
Housing
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.486* 0.072* 0.484** 0.120**
(0.257) (0.204)
Alternative mortgage product (AMP) 1.106*** 0.277*** 0.587** 0.187**
(0.250) (0.248)
Mortgage debt (£10,000s) 0.119*** 0.018*** 0.050* 0.012*  0.021  0.005 0.023 0.007
(0.036) (0.027) (0.021) (0.028)
Loan-to-value ratio  0.403  0.060  0.648  0.160 0.652*** 0.163***  0.217  0.069
(0.330) (0.456) (0.220) (0.407)
Loan-to-income ratio  0.132  0.020 0.089 0.022  0.053  0.013  0.094  0.030
(0.121) (0.066) (0.061) (0.086)
Mortgage interest rate  0.059  0.009 0.014 0.003  0.071***  0.018***  0.086***  0.027***
(0.050) (0.034) (0.026) (0.028)
Household Finances
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.496 0.073  0.406*  0.100* 0.540* 0.135* 0.076 0.024
(0.371) (0.246) (0.285) (0.221)
Credit constrained (= 1)  0.568  0.084 0.435 0.107 0.557* 0.139*  0.614*  0.195*
(0.477) (0.378) (0.331) (0.365)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 325 307 325 307
F-statistic of first stage 8.530 8.160 10.520 8.850
LR chi2 92.635 62.831 233.581 62.070
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.198 0.820 0.000 0.859
Baseline predicted probability 0.201 0.256 0.532 0.475
Note: Table shows IV probit model estimates and average marginal effects for the repayment-type models and interest-type models. The sample is split
in two age groups: households age 18–44 and households age 45 and above. Households at the median are included in the low-income group. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Further notes apply as in Table 6 and Table 7.
Controls for (spouse) employment status, household income, education leaving age, gender, marital status and dependent children.
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Table A5: Mortgage choice – Sample Split by refinancing in the last 3 years
Repayment Type (AMP = 1) Interest Type (ARM = 1)
(1) Recent refinance (2) Not recent (3) Recent refinance (4) Not recent
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Literacy score (0–4)  1.867***  0.192***  0.306*  0.076* 0.561* 0.134* 0.356** 0.118**
(0.376) (0.182) (0.300) (0.142)
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1)  0.410  0.042 0.661*** 0.165*** 0.366 0.087 0.051 0.017
(0.547) (0.200) (0.403) (0.187)
Patience (0–10) 0.045 0.005  0.017  0.004 0.021 0.005  0.006  0.002
(0.097) (0.030) (0.057) (0.025)
Risk attitude (0–10)  0.241*  0.025*  0.026  0.006  0.049  0.012  0.005  0.002
(0.141) (0.036) (0.082) (0.031)
Housing
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.602 0.062 0.185 0.046
(0.462) (0.153)
Alternative mortgage product (AMP) 1.298** 0.310** 0.437** 0.145**
(0.640) (0.185)
Mortgage debt (£10,000s) 0.194** 0.020** 0.041** 0.010**  0.017  0.004  0.007  0.002
(0.079) (0.020) (0.041) (0.017)
Loan-to-value ratio  2.101*  0.216*  0.493**  0.123** 0.720 0.172 0.490*** 0.163***
(1.111) (0.240) (0.698) (0.170)
Loan-to-income ratio  0.654*  0.067* 0.016 0.004  0.082  0.020  0.074  0.025
(0.365) (0.058) (0.136) (0.048)
Mortgage interest rate 0.020 0.002  0.019  0.005  0.109  0.026  0.076***  0.025***
(0.121) (0.023) (0.090) (0.018)
Household Finances
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.889 0.092  0.445**  0.111** 0.003 0.001 0.441** 0.147**
(0.542) (0.217) (0.387) (0.186)
Credit constrained (= 1) 3.572*** 0.368*** 0.215 0.054 0.289 0.069  0.113  0.038
(1.287) (0.295) (0.768) (0.268)
Age
18–34  0.297  0.031  1.119***  0.279***  0.410  0.098 0.130 0.043
(0.759) (0.270) (0.544) (0.228)
35–44  0.169  0.017  0.699***  0.174*** 0.043 0.010 0.122 0.041
(0.750) (0.217) (0.571) (0.191)
45–54  0.076  0.008  0.781***  0.195***  0.059  0.014 0.045 0.015
(0.711) (0.204) (0.525) (0.183)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 144 488 144 488
F-statistic of first stage 6.250 10.970 8.180 13.220
LR chi2 54.916 66.858 36.900 53.658
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.024 0.563 0.103 0.057
Baseline predicted probability 0.236 0.230 0.331 0.615
Note: Table shows IV probit model estimates and average marginal effects for the repayment-type models and interest-type models. The sample is split
by whether the household refinanced their mortgage in the last 3 years. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Further
notes apply as in Table 6 and Table 7.
Omitted reference group for age is 55+. Further controls for (spouse) employment status, household income, education leaving age, gender, marital
status and dependent children.
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Table A6: Interaction of Financial Literacy and Credit Constrained for Repayment Models
Repayment Type (AMP =1)
(1) Full Sample (2) Recent refinance (3) Not recent
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Literacy score (0–4)  0.564***  0.125***  1.452***  0.195***  0.386**  0.102**
(0.150) (0.237) (0.166)
Credit constrained (= 1)  0.797  0.177  2.209*  0.297*  0.497  0.131
(0.629) (1.222) (0.699)
Literacy score x Credit constrained 0.448* 0.099* 1.545*** 0.207*** 0.283 0.075
(0.251) (0.487) (0.295)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 632 144 488
F-statistic of first stage 13.740 6.490 11.810
LR chi2 99.387 44.183 39.936
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.517 0.160 0.996
Baseline predicted probability 0.220 0.141 0.247
Note: Table shows IV probit model estimates and average marginal effects for the repayment type models. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. This specification includes an interaction term between finan-
cial literacy and an indicator variable denoting credit constraints. The interaction is instrumented with the interaction of
the level of math and credit constraints. The sample in Column 1 comprises of all mortgage holders. In the remaining
columns the sample is split by whether the household refinanced their mortgage in the last 3 years (Column 2) or not
(Column 3). Further notes and control variables as in Table 6.
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Table A7: Robustness Models
Repayment Type Interest Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excluding
Endowment
Mortgage
Excluding
“Don’t know’s”
Excluding
(1) and (2)
Excluding
“Don’t know’s”
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Literacy score (0–4)  0.711***  0.127***  0.584***  0.122***  0.787***  0.113*** 0.478*** 0.157***
(0.147) (0.218) (0.198) (0.170)
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1) 0.546*** 0.104*** 0.630*** 0.131*** 0.537** 0.096** 0.220 0.073
(0.209) (0.202) (0.235) (0.174)
Patience (0–10)  0.036  0.007  0.011  0.002  0.008  0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.024)
Risk attitude (0–10)  0.044  0.008  0.040  0.008  0.028  0.005  0.021  0.007
(0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.029)
Housing
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.294** 0.056** 0.417*** 0.087*** 0.366** 0.065**
(0.148) (0.148) (0.161)
Alternative mortgage product (AMP) 0.775*** 0.255***
(0.192)
Mortgage debt (£10,000s) 0.037** 0.007** 0.036* 0.007* 0.048** 0.009**  0.021  0.007
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015)
Loan-to-value ratio  0.423*  0.081*  0.583**  0.121**  0.581**  0.104** 0.593*** 0.195***
(0.234) (0.263) (0.255) (0.170)
Loan-to-income ratio 0.019 0.004 0.017 0.004 0.016 0.003  0.067  0.022
(0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.043)
Mortgage interest rate  0.007  0.001  0.004  0.001  0.004  0.001  0.070***  0.023***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.018)
Household Finances
Recent income loss (= 1)  0.505**  0.096**  0.345  0.072  0.641***  0.114*** 0.405** 0.133**
(0.218) (0.221) (0.244) (0.177)
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.577** 0.110** 0.491* 0.102* 0.622** 0.111** 0.035 0.012
(0.276) (0.284) (0.312) (0.246)
Age
18–34  0.895***  0.171***  1.092***  0.227***  0.917***  0.163***  0.256  0.084
(0.265) (0.286) (0.326) (0.202)
35–44  0.367  0.070  0.610**  0.127**  0.364  0.065  0.007  0.002
(0.240) (0.244) (0.271) (0.187)
45–54  0.567***  0.108***  0.617***  0.129***  0.593**  0.106**  0.106  0.035
(0.219) (0.214) (0.245) (0.175)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 596 564 530 564
F-statistic of first stage 11.190 9.210 8.990 9.210
LR chi2 108.708 95.428 101.136 105.993
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.353 0.941 0.482 0.054
Baseline predicted probability 0.180 0.222 0.173 0.538
Note: Table shows IV probit model estimates and average marginal effects. ‘Literacy score’ is instrumented with ‘math level in school’ in all spec-
ifications. The estimated sample excludes respondents who have an endowment interest-only mortgage in Column 1. In Column 2, respondents are
excluded who answered ‘don’t know’ to the first literacy question or ‘don’t know’ to three or more financial literacy questions. Column 3 combines the
sample restrictions of Columns 1 and 2. Additional control variables as in Table 6. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Omitted reference group for age is 55+. Further controls for (spouse) employment status, household income, education leaving age, gender, marital
status and dependent children.
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Table A8: Interaction of Financial Literacy and Present Bias
(a) Repayment Type (AMP =1)
(1) (2) (3)
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Literacy score (0–4)  0.579***  0.122***  0.578***  0.120***  0.619***  0.128***
(0.159) (0.161) (0.181)
Present biased (= 1) 0.491** 0.102**  0.015  0.003
(0.193) (0.498)
Literacy score x Present biased 0.265 0.055
(0.214)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 632 632 632
F-statistic of first stage 12.230 11.690 12.030
LR chi2 111.665 117.382 120.304
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.683 0.680 0.678
Baseline predicted probability 0.227 0.226 0.227
(b) Interest Type (ARM =1)
(1) (2) (3)
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Literacy score (0–4) 0.393*** 0.117*** 0.394*** 0.117*** 0.413*** 0.123***
(0.138) (0.138) (0.154)
Present biased (= 1) 0.135 0.040 0.442 0.132
(0.171) (0.418)
Literacy score x Present biased  0.144  0.043
(0.186)
Year of Mortgage Origination FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 632 632 632
F-statistic of first stage 15.380 14.770 16.240
LR chi2 175.896 175.862 177.886
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.050 0.050 0.048
Baseline predicted probability 0.530 0.530 0.530
Note: Table shows IV probit model estimates and average marginal effects for the (a) repayment type models and (b)
interest type models. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Specifications are identical
to the full models in Table 6 and Table 7, except that present bias and an interaction term between financial literacy
and present bias are added separately. The interaction is instrumented with the interaction of the level of math and
present bias. Further notes and controls as in Table 6 and Table 7.
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Table A9: Repayment Type Models: All variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
+ Behavioral
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
+ Housing
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
Complete
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Literacy score (0–4)  0.454***  0.107***  0.428***  0.098***  0.609***  0.128***  0.578***  0.120***
(0.156) (0.158) (0.158) (0.161)
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1) 0.570*** 0.131*** 0.491** 0.102**
(0.182) (0.193)
Patience (0–10) 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.027) (0.028)
Risk attitude (0–10)  0.079**  0.018**  0.069**  0.014**
(0.032) (0.034)
Housing
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.511*** 0.108*** 0.506*** 0.105***
(0.148) (0.151)
Mortgage debt (£10,000s) 0.043** 0.009** 0.044** 0.009**
(0.019) (0.019)
Loan-to-value ratio  0.167  0.035  0.170  0.035
(0.209) (0.210)
Loan-to-income ratio  0.017  0.004  0.021  0.004
(0.062) (0.063)
Mortgage interest rate  0.008  0.002  0.007  0.001
(0.023) (0.023)
Year of Mortgage Origination
2011–2012  0.025  0.005  0.013  0.003
(0.333) (0.339)
2009–2010 0.825** 0.174** 0.751** 0.156**
(0.322) (0.330)
2007–2008 0.517 0.109 0.473 0.098
(0.324) (0.332)
2003–2006 0.456 0.096 0.412 0.085
(0.302) (0.308)
1998–2002  0.040  0.008  0.055  0.011
(0.342) (0.348)
before 1997 0.729** 0.154** 0.705** 0.146**
(0.320) (0.327)
Age
18–34  0.930***  0.219***  1.013***  0.232***  0.798***  0.168***  0.869***  0.180***
(0.216) (0.224) (0.249) (0.256)
35–44  0.647***  0.152***  0.775***  0.178***  0.559**  0.118**  0.673***  0.139***
(0.205) (0.212) (0.225) (0.233)
45–54  0.590***  0.139***  0.666***  0.153***  0.407**  0.086**  0.480**  0.099**
(0.188) (0.194) (0.200) (0.207)
Demographics
Male (= 1)  0.042  0.010 0.022 0.005 0.049 0.010 0.111 0.023
(0.148) (0.154) (0.161) (0.168)
Married/living as married (= 1)  0.041  0.010  0.074  0.017  0.219  0.046  0.259  0.054
(0.290) (0.288) (0.315) (0.313)
Dependent children (= 1) 0.247 0.058 0.297* 0.068* 0.205 0.043 0.250 0.052
(0.155) (0.159) (0.164) (0.168)
Employment
continued on next page …
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Table A9 continued …
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
+ Behavioral
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
+ Housing
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
Complete
Repayment Type
(AMP = 1)
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Employed (= 1)  0.296  0.070  0.341*  0.078*  0.216  0.046  0.256  0.053
(0.195) (0.197) (0.207) (0.210)
Unemployed (= 1) 0.113 0.027  0.257  0.059 0.076 0.016  0.187  0.039
(0.622) (0.647) (0.650) (0.671)
Spouse employed (= 1)  0.272  0.064  0.230  0.053  0.057  0.012  0.002  0.000
(0.282) (0.277) (0.307) (0.302)
Spouse unemployed  0.211  0.050  0.284  0.065  0.001  0.000  0.067  0.014
(0.509) (0.514) (0.536) (0.540)
Spouse retired 0.716** 0.169** 0.717** 0.164** 1.057*** 0.223*** 1.075*** 0.223***
(0.360) (0.362) (0.390) (0.391)
Household Finances
Household income < £15000  0.054  0.013  0.132  0.030  0.041  0.009  0.094  0.019
(0.265) (0.267) (0.341) (0.345)
Household income £15,000–£30,000 0.281 0.066 0.266 0.061 0.274 0.058 0.274 0.057
(0.195) (0.195) (0.223) (0.223)
Household income £45,000–£60,000 0.331* 0.078* 0.343* 0.079* 0.152 0.032 0.161 0.033
(0.188) (0.190) (0.206) (0.210)
Household income £60,000–£75,000 0.580** 0.136** 0.653** 0.150** 0.360 0.076 0.419 0.087
(0.258) (0.263) (0.285) (0.290)
Household income > £75,000 0.140 0.033 0.136 0.031  0.394  0.083  0.414  0.086
(0.275) (0.285) (0.369) (0.380)
Recent income loss (= 1)  0.019  0.004  0.017  0.004  0.176  0.037  0.168  0.035
(0.184) (0.186) (0.195) (0.196)
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.443* 0.104* 0.456* 0.104* 0.454* 0.096* 0.478* 0.099*
(0.254) (0.260) (0.265) (0.269)
Note: Table shows all included variables of the IV probit models estimated in Table 6. The same notes apply. The
base for mortgage origination is the year 2013.
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Table A10: Interest Type Models: All variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
+ Behavioral
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
+ Housing
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
Complete
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Literacy score (0–4) 0.325*** 0.115*** 0.397*** 0.118*** 0.337*** 0.118*** 0.394*** 0.117***
(0.115) (0.143) (0.111) (0.138)
Behavioral Characteristics
Present biased (= 1) 0.173 0.061 0.135 0.040
(0.157) (0.171)
Patience (0–10)  0.003  0.001  0.009  0.003
(0.021) (0.023)
Risk attitude (0–10)  0.036  0.013 0.003 0.001
(0.026) (0.029)
Housing
Alternative mortgage product (AMP) 0.826*** 0.246*** 0.811*** 0.241***
(0.191) (0.189)
Mortgage debt (£10,000s)  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.000
(0.016) (0.016)
Loan-to-value ratio 0.368** 0.110** 0.366** 0.109**
(0.173) (0.176)
Loan-to-income ratio  0.069  0.021  0.073  0.022
(0.044) (0.045)
Mortgage interest rate  0.075***  0.022***  0.076***  0.023***
(0.018) (0.018)
Year of Mortgage Origination
2011–2012 0.545** 0.162** 0.554** 0.165**
(0.277) (0.278)
2009–2010 0.840*** 0.250*** 0.846*** 0.252***
(0.299) (0.296)
2007–2008 1.342*** 0.399*** 1.352*** 0.402***
(0.308) (0.305)
2003–2006 1.508*** 0.449*** 1.518*** 0.451***
(0.292) (0.286)
1998–2002 1.772*** 0.527*** 1.787*** 0.532***
(0.303) (0.301)
before 1997 1.465*** 0.436*** 1.476*** 0.439***
(0.311) (0.308)
Age
18–34  0.464***  0.164*** 0.170 0.050  0.476***  0.167*** 0.150 0.045
(0.176) (0.210) (0.178) (0.212)
35–44  0.192  0.068 0.184 0.055  0.219  0.077 0.170 0.050
(0.172) (0.191) (0.173) (0.192)
45–54  0.271*  0.096* 0.001 0.000  0.288*  0.101*  0.007  0.002
(0.162) (0.176) (0.163) (0.177)
Demographics
Male (= 1)  0.014  0.005 0.029 0.009 0.014 0.005 0.031 0.009
(0.118) (0.133) (0.121) (0.138)
Married/living as married (= 1) 0.698*** 0.247*** 0.588** 0.175** 0.653*** 0.229*** 0.608** 0.181**
(0.249) (0.275) (0.248) (0.273)
Dependent children (= 1) 0.105 0.037  0.075  0.022 0.098 0.034  0.067  0.020
(0.121) (0.134) (0.121) (0.134)
Employment
continued on next page …
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Table A10 continued …
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
+ Behavioral
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
+ Housing
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
Complete
Interest Type
(ARM = 1)
 / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin  / SE Margin
Employed (= 1)  0.069  0.024 0.064 0.019  0.071  0.025 0.057 0.017
(0.169) (0.183) (0.169) (0.183)
Unemployed (= 1) 0.059 0.021  0.077  0.023  0.088  0.031  0.162  0.048
(0.629) (0.657) (0.620) (0.653)
Spouse employed (= 1)  0.551**  0.195**  0.293  0.087  0.490**  0.172**  0.311  0.092
(0.238) (0.264) (0.235) (0.259)
Spouse unemployed  0.264  0.093 0.235 0.070  0.243  0.085 0.195 0.058
(0.448) (0.482) (0.445) (0.483)
Spouse retired  0.813**  0.287**  0.765**  0.228**  0.778**  0.273**  0.774**  0.230**
(0.331) (0.361) (0.331) (0.363)
Household Finances
Household income < £15000 0.547** 0.193** 0.825*** 0.245*** 0.521** 0.183** 0.830*** 0.247***
(0.229) (0.294) (0.229) (0.297)
Household income £15,000–£30,000 0.134 0.047 0.243 0.072 0.126 0.044 0.248 0.074
(0.163) (0.179) (0.161) (0.179)
Household income £45,000–£60,000 0.145 0.051 0.139 0.041 0.141 0.050 0.142 0.042
(0.146) (0.166) (0.147) (0.167)
Household income £60,000–£75,000 0.015 0.005  0.163  0.049 0.026 0.009  0.162  0.048
(0.206) (0.240) (0.206) (0.241)
Household income > £75,000  0.015  0.005  0.034  0.010 0.010 0.003  0.044  0.013
(0.209) (0.272) (0.210) (0.275)
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.303* 0.107* 0.388** 0.115** 0.312** 0.109** 0.380** 0.113**
(0.156) (0.170) (0.155) (0.170)
Credit constrained (= 1)  0.050  0.018  0.050  0.015  0.036  0.013  0.062  0.019
(0.221) (0.235) (0.222) (0.237)
Note: Table shows all included variables of the IV probit models estimated in Table 7. The same notes apply. The
base for mortgage origination is the year 2013.
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Table A11: Likelihood-ratio tests
(a) Repayment Type Models
(2) + Behavioral (3) + Housing (4) Complete
(1) Baseline 17.24*** 52.40*** 69.82***
(2) + Behavioral 35.17** 52.58***
(3) + Housing 17.42***
(b) Interest Type Models
(2) + Behavioral (3) + Housing (4) Complete
(1) Baseline 17.38*** 202.03*** 214.91***
(2) + Behavioral 184.65*** 197.53***
(3) + Housing 12.88**
Note: Table shows results of the Likelihood-ratio tests comparing all
model specifications shown in Table 6 (Panel A) and Table 7 (Panel B).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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